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Abstract
Consider a housing problem in which each agent arrives at the market with an endowment
but is unsure of the value of others’ objects and is unwilling to exchange without learning
more. An individually rational, Pareto optimal and strategyproof exchange requires
Gale’s Top Trading Cycles but the ability to investigate others’ endowments must also
be introduced. For the instance in which each agent has only the resources to learn about
one other object, I show how agents’ decisions over what to learn about restricts the
size of the trading cycles. Large cycles are risky and so no cycle containing more than
two agents can exist in equilibrium. I then give the conditions under which stability
and ex-ante welfare maximisation are mutually compatible objectives. If objects are
‘well ranked’ in the sense that the objects of highest value are also more likely to be
acceptable, then any profile of agents’ learning decisions which is stable is also an ex-ante
welfare maximising equilibrium. Introducing a time dimension which allows agents to
choose not only what to learn about, but when, does not rule out equilibria in which
all agents learn quickly and at the same time. The same learning pattern as observed
when agents are forced to make the decision simultaneously, remains an equilibrium
when this restriction is removed. Even o↵ering the agents the opportunity to learn
carefully, one by one, making decisions with the most information they can does not
prevent the rush to learn at the same time as others in equilibrium. The information
acquisition problem is by no means unique to unilateral matches and so I also consider the
particular allocation mechanism used for university entry in the UK. The combination
of allowing applications to be submitted to only two institutions and students only being
able to acquire information on their grades after submission results in poorly assortative
allocations where the best students are unable to attend higher-ranked instiutions.
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Introduction
Matching markets, such as college admissions, human kidney exchange, graduate job
assignment and house allocation have long been the subject of investigation. In such
markets, indivisible goods and services must often be allocated without monetary trans-
fers. Two of the most famous mechanisms designed to allocate goods or assign places in
such circumstances are Gale’s Top Trading Cycles (Shapley and Scarf (1974)) and De-
ferred Acceptance (Gale and Shapley (1962)). These mechanisms use agents’ preferences
to create a match with desirable properties such as Pareto optimality, strategyproofness,
individual rationality and stability. However, the requirement that agents always know
their preferences over all options available to them can be an onerous one as their ability
to acquire that information may easily be limited in some way, either through high costs,
restricted resources or institutional constraints. I examine the impact of an information
acquisition requirement on ‘high stakes’ markets such as kidney exchange and within
the UK’s higher education system to determine how such requirements may a↵ect the
outcome that is realised.
Chapters 1 and 2 explore models of ‘high stakes’ unilateral matching markets with
endogenous information acquisition. Agents are fully informed about their own endow-
ments: a patient in need of a kidney exchange will already know she is incompatible with
her willing living donor and a council tenant will be living in her current property and
know the local area intimately. However, although some cursory information may be
available, each agent knows far less about the other endowments available for exchange
and is unwilling to give up her own without knowing she is getting something better in
return. This is particularly clear in the case of living donor kidney exchange, since a
doctor would not consent to transplant an organ without first ensuring compatibility.
For the case where each agent is able to investigate just one other object (for example,
due to a back up at the lab or prohibitively high costs), I analyse the impact of the
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endogenous information acquisition on the exchanges which can take place under Gale’s
Top Trading Cycles. I identify conditions under which the outcome of any stable learning
profile is the same (or negligibly close to) the best society can achieve were the process
to be managed by a designer able to dictate actions to each agent.
Chapter 2 builds on a version of the model in Chapter 1, but where agents are not re-
quired to make their decision simultaneously. Instead, agents are free to choose not only
which object they investigate but when to do so. This means the equilibrium outcomes
begin to di↵er from that which a social planner might wish to impose. Fully sequential
learning, where agents learn one after the other, prevents wasteful learning as few agents
as possible are forced to investigate an object without first knowing the preferences of
its owner. However, fully sequential learning can also create situations where individuals
lose out and by the time they come to choose which object to investigate, there are no
more partners to exchange with. The threat of being left alone means that more agents
learn simultaneously than is socially desirable.
Chapter 3 turns to a two-sided market where students are assigned places at university.
In the UK, the University and College Admissions Service (UCAS) requires students to
begin their application process not only before learning their exam results but before
sitting their exams. Universities base their acceptance decisions on the students’ grades
but students are able to acquire this information only after submitting a preference to
UCAS. In addition, students are limited to submitting their application to only two
universities. Despite the UCAS system having features otherwise in common with the
student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism, this combination of factors can have
severe consequences for the assortativity of the resulting match, where the highest-ranked
institutions are not attended by the best students.
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.CHAPTER 1:
Top Trading Cycles in Endogenous
Information Acquisition
1 Paper 1
1.1 Introduction
Consider a unilateral matching problem in which each agent is endowed with one object
that they are free to exchange with other such agents. Common examples of such
problems include living donor kidney exchange, council house exchange programmes
and college dorm swapping policies. In each of these cases the agent is fully informed
about her own endowment: a patient will already know she is incompatible with her
donor, a council tenant will be living in her current property and the college student
will know both her dorm and roommates. However, though some cursory information
may be available, each agent knows far less about the other endowments available for
exchange. This is more problematic for some scenarios than others. The college student
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may be willing to take a gamble on a new room but the council tenant is unlikely
to want to uproot her life for a property she has not viewed in an area she does not
know. For the patient in need of a new kidney, the consequences of a transplant with
an incompatible organ are deadly. In such cases, and whether it be due to prohibitively
high costs or limited resources, resistance to exchange without complete information only
becomes more acute as the agent’s ability to investigate diminishes. But if agents will
only exchange for objects they know to be compatible then they must carefully consider
which objects they want to investigate; if they cannot learn everything then they do not
want to waste opportunities on dead ends. In such cases, one must take into account the
organisation of agents’ investigations alongside the design of the exchange process itself.
This paper explores such a model in which agents must acquire information about objects
before committing to an exchange. The importance of including learning in the model
in this way is most easily demonstrated within the context of kidney exchange.
When a person requires a new kidney three cases may arise. It might be that the
patient has no donor at all and remains on the waiting list for a cadaver organ or that
they are successful in finding a compatible living donor organ. This model is applicable
in the third case in which each patient can find only an incompatible living donor.
If the mechanism used to exchange these donor organs is to be individually rational,
Pareto optimal and strategyproof then it must be Gale’s Top Trading Cycles (GTT)
(Shapley and Scarf (1974)) since it is the unique mechanism satisfying these properties
(Ma (1994), Roth (1982)). However, before any exchange can take place the organs
must be tested; a kidney can never be safely transplanted without first confirming its
compatibility with the patient. This means concentrating solely on the exchange process
may not be su cient to ensure an optimal outcome. An analysis of the deterministic
mechanism used by the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) (Dickerson et al.
(2013)) found that only 7% of matches ever resulted in a completed transplant. Since
not all costly testing procedures were performed upfront, 16% of matches failed explicitly
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because the organ was ultimately found to be incompatible. A model which incorporates
the need to learn before exchange may reduce the incidence of failed matches.
This paper explores a model in which each of a finite set of agents is endowed with a
single indivisible object. Each agent knows about their own endowment but has little
information on anyone else’s object; they know the probability they will find any given
object to be acceptable, that is, to have a higher value than their own endowment
and the expected value conditional on that being the case. Agents are only willing
to exchange for objects they are certain to strictly prefer to their endowment. In this
sense, the model is closer to the ‘high-stakes’ kidney example above than the ‘low-
stakes’ dorm swap. In order to ascertain whether they strictly prefer an object or
not, each agent is able to simultaneously investigate one object (other than their own
endowment). A learning profile details which object each agent investigates and upon
learning the outcome of these investigations, objects can be exchanged. Since agents
will only exchange for objects certain to be strictly preferred to their own endowment,
agents can only exchange for investigated objects and so the pattern of investigations
a↵ects which trades may eventually take place.
The question is then over how the investigations and exchanges should be organised.
When information is known, the obvious candidate is GTT since it is the unique in-
dividually rational, Pareto optimal and strategyproof mechanism, and so one option is
to na¨ıvely continue using GTT with incomplete information. In this case, since GTT
is strategyproof, each agent need only consider which object to investigate. The con-
sequences of this decision, however, have significant impact on trade in equilibrium. A
trading cycle can occur only if every agent in that cycle learns she prefers the object
she has investigated to her own endowment. The more agents involved in the potential
trading cycle, the higher the risk at least one test, and consequently the trade itself,
will fail. Potential trading cycles such as this are known here as learning cycles. Large
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learning cycles create an incentive for at least one agent to ‘short circuit’ the cycle and
create a smaller one in which she can trade for an object of weakly greater expected
value but with strictly higher probability of exchange. As a result, in equilibrium only
small learning cycles of two agents exist and so any given trading cycle under GTT will
involve at most two agents. This is in contrast with the kidney exchange literature,
where due to the constraints of hospitals, exchange is often exogenously restricted to
two agent-donor pairs (Roth et al. (2004), (2005)). In this paper, since the two-agent
cycles arise endogenously, such a restriction would leave the results una↵ected.
There is little reason, however, to assume that the na¨ıve GTT approach will work well in
an incomplete information environment and so other organisational structures should be
considered. Many alternatives exists and so here I examine two extremes with respect
to the role of the designer. At one extreme, designers are able to dictate which test
each agent performs and which exchanges take place. In this case, any learning profile
can be enforced and so learning cycles (and in turn, trading cycles) may consist of any
number of agents and their endowments. At the other extreme, the designer has no input
and agents are left to coordinate amongst themselves. In this case I consider the set of
stable learning profiles. The stable set has an important feature in common with the
set of equilibria in the na¨ıve GTT approach; learning cycles contain only two agents. If
not, then any two agents with the best two endowments in any given learning cycle will
be strictly better o↵ by investigating each other’s respective endowments. Unlike the
equilibria of the na¨ıve GTT approach, if a learning profile is stable then the maximum
number of agents possible must be in learning cycles. It is also important which agents
are in which cycle; the two agents with the best endowments must be paired together,
otherwise they both have the incentive to deviate. In the same way, the agents with
the next two best endowments must also be paired together and so on. When no two
objects are the same, this means a unique set of learning cycles forms under any stable
learning profile.
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When all investigations and exchanges can be dictated to agents, the size of the learning
cycles is uninhibited by the same threat of deviation, but nevertheless large learning
cycles can be undesirable. If the designer’s goal is to maximise ex-ante welfare, then
large learning cycles still carry unnecessarily high risk. For this reason, any learning
cycle arising under an ex-ante welfare maximising learning profile will consist of at most
three agents. Which learning cycle each particular agent is in and whether that learning
cycle consists of two or three agents depends on the given set of objects but, for a class
of objects known here as ‘strictly well ranked,’ there is a clear structure to the learning
cycles. Objects are strictly well ranked if they are ordered in the same way whether by
the probability they will be found acceptable or by their potential value. When objects
are strictly well ranked then agents must be grouped in cycles in descending order of
the potential value of their endowments in order to maximise ex-ante welfare. This is
similar to the structure of the unique set of stable learning cycles discussed above, with
the exception that some of those learning cycles may contain three agents. If objects
are strictly well ranked, however, then three-agent cycles will occur only if there are
significant di↵erences in the probability of objects being acceptable. Such di↵erences
divide endowments into groups of ‘good’ and ‘junk’ objects. The designer will create
three-agents cycles to avoid condemning an agent with a good endowment to a learning
cycle with one or more junk objects that jeopardise the probability of exchange. If there
are no junk objects, then these three-agent cycles are not required and it is the set of two-
agent learning cycles which maximises ex-ante welfare. In this case, strategic concerns
do not compromise the welfare goal; any stable learning profile yields the highest level
of ex-ante welfare possible. Since this is the highest ex-ante welfare that can be reached
through two-agent cycles alone, the stable learning profile also compares favourably with
the equilibria of the na¨ıve GTT approach. When objects are strictly well ranked, and
regardless of the presence of junk objects, no equilibrium can generate ex-ante welfare
which exceeds that of the stable learning profile.
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The literature on endogenous information acquisition within the matching field is not
extensive. Bade (2015) shows that when learning is costly, serial dictatorship is the
unique ex-ante Pareto optimal, strategyproof and nonbossy allocation mechanism when
information is endogenous. Harless and Manjunath (2017) find that top trading cy-
cles dominate priority rules in progressive measures of social welfare under costless but
restricted learning. The key di↵erence in this paper is that each agent arrives at the
problem with an endowment already in place and so priority rules such as serial dicta-
torship cannot be applied without compromising individual rationality. In the kidney
exchange literature, Dickerson et. al (2013) use random graph models to increase the
number of successful matches in algorithmic programs and Blum et al. (2013) use such
models to show that the problem of maximising the number of expected exchanges with
two crossmatch opportunities is NP complete. As in this paper, learning is restricted
and an exchange only takes place with some probability. However, the models do not
examine individual incentives.
1.2 Environment
A finite set of agents N = {1, ...n} is such that each agent i is endowed with object i
in the set K = {k1, ..., kn}. An agent values his own endowment at zero but does not
know his value for any other object, only that the value is drawn from some distribution
with an expected value less than that of his endowment. All agents are expected util-
ity maximisers, so without any further information each agent prefers to keep his own
endowment. More formally, there exists a state space ⌦ consisting of profiles of values
! = (!ik)i2N,k2K , where !
i
k is the value of object k to agent i in state !. Since agents
value their own endowment at zero, !ii = 0 for all ! 2 ⌦. For all other objects, !ik is
an independent draw from some distribution f ik with some support not containing zero
1
1This is to prevent indi↵erences in what follows.
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and such that E(!ik) < 0 for all i 2 N, k 2 K. This means firstly, Agent i knows the
probability that an object k 6= i will be acceptable, ⇡ik = ⇡({! | !ik > 0}), which is the
probability that !ik is higher than his own endowment. Secondly, it means Agent i also
knows the conditional value of the object Eik = E(!ik|!ik > 0), which is the expected
value of k conditional on the object being acceptable. For the majority of the paper,
unless otherwise specified, I assume agents are ex-ante identical while objects may di↵er.
In this case, f ik = fk for all i 2 N, k 2 K such that i 6= k and !ik is an iid draw from
fk. Let Ek := E(!ik | !ik > 0) and ⇡k := ⇡(!ik > 0) for all i 2 N, k 2 K. Two objects
j, k 2 K are considered to be ex-ante identical if ⇡kEk = ⇡jEj . For simplicity, when
at least two objects are not ex-ante identical and without loss of generality, I assume
⇡1E1   ⇡2E2   ...   ⇡nEn. In this way, Agent 1 is always endowed with the best object,
Agent 2 is endowed with either the best or second best object and so on until Agent n
who is endowed with the worst object.
Each agent i learns the value !ik of one object k 6= i. A learning profile is a strategy
profile2 a = (ai)i2N such that a 2 A = ⇥i2NAi. A learning cycle is a vector (k1, ...km)
such that aki = ki+1 for all i < m and am = k1. An m-cycle is a learning cycle that con-
tains m agents. The set of learning cycles that forms under a is o(a) = {o1(a), ...o⌫(a)}.
For any j 2 {1, ...⌫}, let  j(a) = {k1, ...km} be the set of agents in the learning cy-
cle oj(a) = (k1, ...km). The set of all agents in learning cycles under a is C(a) and
B(a) = N \C(a) is the set of agents not in learning cycles under a. The set of all agents
in m-cycles under a is Cm(a) and Bm(a) = N \ Cm(a).
Although the probability an an agent will find Object k acceptable (⇡k) and the condi-
tional value of Object k (Ek) are drawn from the same distribution (fk) for all agents
i 6= k, given the state and each agent having chosen which object to investigate, each
2For the moment, attention is restricted to pure strategies, where each agent investigates a particular
object with certainty. Relaxing this and allowing for mixed strategies can, under some circumstances,
a↵ect the results in this chapter. These e↵ects are explored in Appendix D.
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agent may have di↵erent (ex-post) preferences over the set of objects. Agent i’s tran-
sitive ex-post preference relation under any given learning profile a and set of object
values ! is Ri(a,!), where kRi(a,!)k0 if Agent i weakly prefers k to k0. If kRi(a,!)k0
but not k0Ri(a,!)k then it is denoted kPi(a,!)k0. The ex-post preference profile is
R(a,!) = (Ri(a,!))i2N and the set of all possible ex-post preference profiles is R. If
i chooses to learn about object k then kRi(a,!)i if !ik > 0. Since each agent tests
only one object and any untested objects have an expected value below i’s endow-
ment, there is at most one k 6= i such that kRi(a,!)i. There may, however, be many
untested objects k0 6= i such that iRi(a,!)k0 and it is possible that an agent is indif-
ferent between two such objects. A matching is a bijection µ : N ! K. The set of
all matchings is M. Under any given learning profile a and set of object values !, a
matching is individually rational if µ(i)Ri(a,!)i for all i 2 N and a matching µ0 Pareto
dominates µ if µ0(i)Ri(a,!)µ(i) for all i 2 N and µ0(i⇤)Pi⇤(a,!)µ(i⇤) for at least one
i⇤ 2 N . If a matching is not Pareto dominated then it is Pareto optimal. A mecha-
nism, M : R ! M, is individually rational and Pareto optimal if it always results in
an individually rational and Pareto optimal matching. A mechanism is strategyproof if
M(R(a,!))(i)Ri(a,!)M(R0i(a,!), R i(a,!))(i) for all i 2 N,R0i(a,!) so that no agent
i, whose truthful preferences are Ri, can be matched with an object they strictly prefer
to M(R(a,!))(i) by stating some alternative preference profile R0i 6= Ri.
1.3 Solution Concepts
Given the environment, the questions remains as to how both investigations and ex-
changes should be organised. There are many ways in which this task could be executed
and so I focus on three approaches. The first focusses on the Gale’s Top Trading Cycles
(GTT ) mechanism. Without the need to learn about other objects, GTT would be the
sole candidate since it is the unique individually rational, Pareto optimal and strate-
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gyproof mechanism. With the additional information acquisition stage, however, simply
declaring GTT as the mechanism to be used in the matching stage may a↵ect agents’
decision over which objects to investigate. To this end, I analyse the range of equilibria
which may arise when agents first choose which objects to investigate and then, having
determined the results of those tests, arematched via GTT .
To establish the extent to which the equilibria which arise under GTT are desirable,
I compare these results to two further approaches. These two approaches capture the
range of possible outcomes with respect to input from a designer (or dictator). Under
the second approach I focus on the set of stable learning profiles. These are the learning
profiles which arise when agents are permitted to decide on both which object they
choose to learn about and which objects they would like to exchange for, without input
from a designer. Under the third approach I move to the opposite end of the spectrum
and analyse the best possible outcomes achievable when a dictator is able to determine
both the investigation and match.
Approach 1: Equilibrium
Under this approach, agents first choose ai and then, having learned the value of their
investigated objects, declare their preferences R(a,!) and are matched via the Gale’s
Top Trading Cycles mechanism, GTT : R!M which works as follows:
Step r: Each unmatched agent i points at his most preferred object ac-
cording to Ri(a,!) from amongst those remaining. Each object points at its
owner. At least one cycle forms. All agents in a cycle receive the object they
are pointing at and are removed. If at least one agent remains then proceed
to step r + 1. If not then end.
GTT ends when all agents have been matched with an object. The domain of the prefer-
ences R considered here, di↵ers from the conventional GTT domain in which preferences
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over all objects are strict. However, the indi↵erence between some objects permitted un-
der R does not a↵ect the mechanism’s function since if agent i is indi↵erent between
object k and k0 then it must be that iPi(a,!)k and iPi(a,!)k0. Therefore, i will always
point at and be matched to his own object before needing to choose between objects
to which he is indi↵erent. Even in this domain, GTT remains the unique individually
rational, Pareto optimal and strategyproof mechanism.3
GTT ’s property of strategyproofness plays an important role here. Once agents have
completed their investigations, it is a weakly dominant strategy for an agent to truthfully
report her preferences; an agent cannot induce a better outcome for herself by misrep-
resenting her true preferences. Having reached the matching stage of the problem, the
equilibrium is determined through weak dominance. Given the use of the strategyproof
GTT in this stage, agents’ expected utilities are determined largely by the learning
profile arising in the first ‘learning’ stage where each agent chooses which object to
investigate.
Agent i’s expected utility firstly depends on the probability i is matched with ai: ⇡({! |
GTT (R(a,!))(i) = ai}). In order for i to be matched to ai, it not only needs to be that
i finds ai acceptable but that a trading cycle can form between a group of S agents such
that i 2 S. For this to be the case, every agent in S must investigate the endowment
of a di↵erent agent in S and it must that !jaj > 0 for all j 2 S. Secondly, i’s expected
utility depends on the conditional value of the object agent i chooses to learn about,
Eiai . Agent i’s expected utility is the product of these two terms:
Ui(a) = ⇡({! | GTT (R(a,!))(i) = ai}) · Eiai
Agent i will choose ai to maximise her ex-ante expected utility. Since agents simulta-
3The proof in Bade (2019) applies to the domain R. The proof in Ma (1994) is not applicable since
it uses the full domain of preferences.
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neously make their decision over which object to investigate and agents are assumed to
follow their weakly dominant strategy of revealing their true preferences in the matching
stage (when using the strategyproof GTT mechanism) a learning profile a is a Bayes-
Nash equilibrium if Ui(a)   Ui(a0i, a i) for all i 2 N .
Approach 2: Stability
The second approach examines what is possible when there is minimal (no) input from a
designer and agents are able to act strategically at both the learning and matching stage
of the problem. Comparison of the outcomes under this approach and the equilibrium
approach discussed above is simplified since any di↵erences can only occur as a result
of what happens in the learning stage and not the matching stage. This is because,
having completed all investigations and learned the value of their investigated objects,
any mechanism,M , used by the agents which is individually rational and Pareto optimal
must yield the same match as would arise under GTT : M(R(a,!)) = GTT (R(a,!))4.
The properties of individual rationality and Pareto optimality are important to retain
in this approach since agents cannot be forced into matches by some authority and by
the same token, cannot be prevented from seeking Pareto improvements which make
some subset of agents strictly better o↵. Since M(R(a,!)) = GTT (R(a,!)) and GTT
is strategyproof, M must also be strategyproof and so it is a weakly dominant strategy
for any agent to truthfully report her preferences.
Since the matching stage is identical under both Approaches 1 and 2, any di↵erence
must occur in the learning stage. In Approach 1 there was a Bayes-Nash Equilibrium if
no single agent could benefit by deviating from her learning decision. In Approach 2, I
focus on learning profiles where no subset of agents can benefit by deviating from their
learning decisions: A learning profile a is stable if under a there is no subset S of m
agents who are not in a given m-cycle but all agents in S would have a strictly higher
4A proof is provided in Appendix C
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expected utility if they were. If this holds for all subsets of m agents such that m = 2
then the learning profile is pairwise stable. Since M(R(a,!)) = GTT (R(a,!)), Agent
i’s expected utility under profile a, Ui(a) can be expressed in the same way as detailed
in Approach 1.
Approach 3: Ex-ante Welfare Maximisation
At the opposite end of the scale to the stability approach (where decisions are decen-
tralised and agents are able to decide both which object to investigate and match with),
in this approach I examine the learning profiles which are most socially desirable as
measured by ex-ante welfare, W (a) =
P
i2N Ui(a). A dictator is able to decide which
investigation each agent should complete. For example, a centralised health service may
decide which crossmatch blood tests to perform between potential patients and donors.
The dictator is able to determine tests and to decide exchanges subject to the mini-
mal requirements of individual rationality (ie. the dictator cannot compel a individual
to give up their kidney against their will) and Pareto optimality (the dictator cannot
deny transplants which do not disadvantage other patients). In this sense, the dicta-
tor seeks the learning profile a⇤ such that a⇤ 2 argmaxa2AW (a). As with the two
previous approaches, since the matching stage is individually rational and Pareto op-
timal, it must be that M(R(a⇤,!)) = GTT (R(a⇤,!)). Since GTT is strategyproof, it
is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent to report her true preferences given the
information acquired in the learning stage. This means that the utility of each individ-
ual Agent i under the learning profile a⇤ can be calculated as detailed in Approach 1:
Ui(a⇤) = ⇡({! | GTT (R(a⇤,!))(i) = a⇤i }) · Eia⇤i .
Given some preference profile, all three approaches will result in an identical matching
between agents and objects. However, the three approaches can di↵er drastically in
terms of permissible learning profiles. The next three sections characterise these learning
profiles and compare the ex-ante welfare achievable under each approach.
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1.4 Properties of Stable Learning Profiles
Depending on the set of agents and their endowments, the characteristics of learning
profiles under each of the three approaches may di↵er. In this section I characterise the
set of stable learning profiles as it provides a useful starting point when also considering
any equilibrium or ex-ante welfare maximising learning profile. Section 1.3 introduced
the definitions of stability and pairwise stability. Before continuing, note that since
pairwise stability implies stability, it is su cient to focus on pairwise deviations in the
discussion which follows.
Lemma 1. If a is pairwise stable then a is stable
Proof. Suppose a is pairwise stable but not stable. Then there exists an a0 under which
an m-cycle, (b, c, ..., d) forms between some S = {b, c, ..., d} such that Uk(a0S , a S) >
Uk(a) for all k 2 S. Since a is pairwise stable, |S| > 2. W.l.o.g let b < d < k for all k 2 S\
{b, d}. Since Uk(a0S , a S) > Uk(a) for all k 2 S, Ub(a0S , a S) =
Q
k2S ⇡kEc > Ub(a) and
Ud(a0S , a S) =
Q
k2S ⇡kEb > Ud(a). But then there also exists a strategy profile a
00 under
which the learning cycle (b, d) forms such that Ub(a00{b,d}, a
0
S\{b,d}, a S) = ⇡b⇡dEd and
Ud(a00{b,d}, a
0
S\{b,d}, a S) = ⇡b⇡dEb. Then, Uk(a
00
{b,d}, a
0
S\{b,d}, a S) > Uk(a
0
S , a S) > Uk(a)
for k 2 {b, d}. Since b and d’s expected utility under a00 is independent of all other agents’
strategies, it must also be that Ub(a00{b,d}, a {b,d}) > Ub(a) and Ud(a
00
{b,d}, a {b,d}) > Ud(a).
But this implies that a is pairwise not stable, which is a contradiction.
1.4.1 The bi-cycle set, AS
In order to characterise the set of all stable learning profiles, I first characterise a set of
learning profile AS as the set of learning profiles which meet conditions I, II and III
below. These conditions restrict learning profiles to those which contain only 2-cycles
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and also limits the range of agents each agent can be in a learning cycle with. The size
of AS varies depending on the values of ⇡i and Ei for each object but after introducing
the set AS , I introduce the set A  ⇢ AS which produces a fixed set of learning cycles
and exists for any given set of objects. In the next section, I then show that a learning
profile is stable if and only if it is contained in the set AS .
Define the set AS such that a learning profile, a is in the set AS if and only if:
I: If n is even then all agents are in 2-cycles. If n is odd then all agents are in 2-cycles
except for some i⇤ such that ⇡i⇤Ei⇤ = ⇡nEn.
and for any pair of agents i, j such that ⇡iEi > ⇡jEj and (i, j) 2 o(a):
II: If there are two agents i0, j0 such that (i0, j0) 2 o(a) and ⇡iEi = ⇡i0Ei0 then ⇡j0Ej0  
⇡iEi.
III: There is no agent j⇤ such that ⇡iEi > ⇡j⇤Ej⇤ > ⇡jEj .
These three conditions mean that AS may contain many di↵erent learning profiles that
each generate di↵erent sets of learning cycles. The number of learning profiles in AS
depends in part on the the number of objects which are ex-ante identical. Let   =
{ 1, ...  r¯} form a partition on N such that for any i 2  r and i0 2  r0 , ⇡iEi > ⇡i0Ei0
if and only if r < r0. Then all the objects in any given  t are ex-ante identical. The
following example illustrates some of the learning profiles and their associated learning
cycles that are and are not in AS for a given set of agents and objects.
Example 1. Let N = {1, ...8} and ⇡1E1 > ⇡2E2 > ⇡3E3 = ⇡4E4 > ⇡5E5 = ⇡6E6 =
⇡7E7 > ⇡8E8. For this set of objects, AS = {a1, a2, a3} as illustrated in Figure 1. In
contrast, Figure 2 shows three learning profiles a4, a5, a6 /2 AS . Clearly a4 /2 AS since it
contains two m-cycles such that m > 2, violating condition I. Under a5, ⇡3E3 = ⇡4E4
and ⇡3E3 > ⇡5E5 = ⇡6E6, violating II. Finally, (1, 3) 2 o(a6) but ⇡1E1 > ⇡2E2 > ⇡3E3
and so III does not hold. Also note that a4, a5 and a6 each only violate one of the three
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conditions.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
  1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
1
  2   3   4   5
  1   2   3   4   5
  1   2   3   4   5
Figure 1: The set of learning cycles generated under the three learning
allocations in AS : (a) a1 and (b) a2 and (c) a3.
The size of AS will vary depending on the number of di↵erent values of ⇡iEi and the
number of agents with each of those values. There is, however, a set of learning alloca-
tions which is always in AS .
Observation 1. Define A  := {a | ai = i   1 if i 2 N even , ai = i + 1 if i 2 N \
{n} odd }, then A  ✓ AS.
An example of a learning profile in the set A  is shown in Figure 1(a). There are eight
agents, all in in 2-cycles so it meets condition I. Since every even numbered agent i
is in a 2-cycle with i   1 it also meets conditions II and III. The learning profiles in
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
  1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
1
  2   3   4   5
  1   2   3   4   5
  1   2   3   4   5
Figure 2: The set of learning cycles generated under learning alloca-
tions not in AS : (a) a4 and (b) a5 and (c) a6.
A  can be constructed for any set of agents and objects and since any a 2 A  satisfies
conditions I, II and III, A  ✓ AS . Since the number of agents is even, the learning
profile illustrated in Figure 1(a) is in fact the only learning profile in A  for this set of
objects. The definition of A  prescribes ai for all i 2 N if n is even and for all i 2 N \{n}
otherwise so |A | = 1 if n is even. If n is odd the learning profiles in A  can di↵er only in
an and so |A | = n  1 if n is odd. However, as shown in Figure 3, even though A  may
contain multiple learning profiles, the learning cycles arising from those profiles is unique.
Observation 2. For any given set of objects, the set of learning cycles o(a) that can
form under any a 2 A  is unique.
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If n is even then Observation 2 follows from the fact that |A | = 1. If n is odd then since
there is no i 2 N such that ai = n under any a 2 A , n is never in a learning cycle under
any a 2 A . By the definition of A  , ai is constant across all a 2 A  for all i 2 N \ {n}.
As such, the set of learning cycles which forms is:
o  = o(a) = {(1, 2), (3, 4), ...(k, k + 1)}
for all a 2 A , where k = n  1 if n is even and k = n  2 otherwise.
3 41 2 5
3 41 2 5
3 41 2 5
3 41 2 5
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3: Learning profiles in A  when n = 5
In general, AS will contain learning profiles other than those in A . Figure 1 shows three
sets of learning cycles for the same agents, all of which result from learning profiles in
AS but only (a) is generated by a learning profile in A . The only di↵erence between
the three sets of learning cycles in Figure 1 is that agents 5, 6 and 7 have exchanged
places which is possible because ⇡5E5 = ⇡6E6 = ⇡7E7. If there are no such equalities
and ⇡1E1 > ... > ⇡nEn then the set AS will only contain the learning profiles in A .
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1.4.2 The stable set, AS
The stable set of learning profiles is characterised by conditions I, II and III. Lemmas
2 and 3 show that a learning profile is stable if and only if a 2 AS .
Lemma 2. If a 2 AS then a is stable.
Proof. If any a 2 AS is not stable then by Lemma 1 there is some pair of agents c, c0 2 N
such that (c, c0) /2 o(a) and for a0c = c0, ac = c0, Ui(a) < Ui(a0{c,c0}, a {c,c0}) for i 2 {c, c0}.
By I at most one agent is not in a 2-cycle under a so w.l.o.g let (c, b) 2 o(a), where b 2 N .
Then Uc(a) = ⇡c⇡bEb < ⇡c⇡c0Ec0 = Uc(a0{c,c0}, a {c,c0}), which implies ⇡bEb < ⇡c0Ec0 .
First suppose ⇡cEc < ⇡c0Ec0 . Since ⇡c0Ec0 6= mini2N ⇡iEi, by I there is some b0 2 N
such that (c0, b0) 2 o(a). Since Uc0(a) = ⇡c0⇡b0Eb0 < ⇡c0⇡cEc = Uc0(a0{c,c0}, a {c,c0}),
⇡b0Eb0 < ⇡cEc. But then ⇡b0Eb0 < ⇡cEc < ⇡c0Ec0 and since (c0, b0) 2 o(a), a violates III
and so a /2 AS .
Now suppose ⇡cEc   ⇡c0Ec0 . Then ⇡bEb < ⇡c0Ec0  ⇡cEc. By III, since (c, b) 2 o(a)
it must be that ⇡bEb < ⇡c0Ec0 = ⇡cEc. Since ⇡c0Ec0 6= mini2N ⇡iEi, by I (c0, b0) 2
o(a). Since ⇡c0Ec0 = ⇡cEc, II implies ⇡b0Eb0   ⇡cEc = ⇡c0Ec0 > ⇡bEb. Then Uc0(a) =
⇡c0⇡b0Eb0   ⇡c0⇡cEc = Uc0(a0{c,c0}, a {c,c0}) and so no pair of agents c, c0 exists such that
a 2 AS is not stable.
Lemma 3. A learning allocation a is stable only if a 2 AS.
Proof. Fix some aS 2 A such that aS is stable but aS /2 AS because it violates one or
more of I, II or III.
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Suppose aS /2 argmaxa2A |C2(a)| so that o(aS) does not contain the maximum possible
number of 2-cycles that can form between agents, violating I. Then |B2(aS)|   2. Let
b, b0 2 B2(aS) be such that b = maxB2(aS) and b0 = maxB2(aS) \ {b}. Since b, b0 2
B2(aS), b and b0 are either not in a cycle or in an m-cycle such that m > 2. In either
case Ui(aS) < ⇡b⇡b0Eb0 for i 2 {b, b0}. But for a0b = b0 and a0b0 = b, Ui(a0{b,b0}, aS {b,b0}) =
⇡b⇡b0Ea0i for i 2 {b, b0} and so aS is not stable.
So it must be that if aS 2 AS then aS 2 argmaxa2A |C2(a)|. If the number of agents
n is even then all agents will be in 2-cycles and B2(aS) = ;. If n is odd then there
is one agent b⇤ not in any cycle such that {b⇤} = B2(aS). Suppose ⇡b⇤Eb⇤ > ⇡nEn.
Then there exists some cycle (c, c0) 2 o(aS) such that ⇡c0Ec0 = ⇡nEn. Under this
set of cycles, Ub⇤(aS) = 0 and Uc(aS) = ⇡c⇡c0Ec0 . But for a0b⇤ = c and a
0
c = b
⇤,
Ui(a0{b⇤,c}, a
S {b⇤, c}) = ⇡b⇤⇡cEa0i > Ui(aS) for i 2 {b⇤, c} and so aS is not stable.
Now suppose there are two cycles (i, j), (i0, j0) 2 o(a) such that ⇡iEi > ⇡jEj and
⇡iEi = ⇡i0Ei0 > ⇡j0Ej0 , so that aS violates II. Then Ui(aS) = ⇡i⇡jEj and Ui0(aS) =
⇡i0⇡j0Ej0 . But since ⇡iEi > ⇡jEj and ⇡iEi = ⇡i0Ei0 > ⇡j0Ej0 , for a0i = i0 and a0i0 = i,
Ui(a0{i,i0}, a
S
 {i,i0}) = ⇡i⇡i0Ei0 > Ui(a
S) and Ui0(a0{i,i0}, a
S
 {i,i0}) = ⇡i⇡i0Ei > Ui0(a
S) and so
aS is not stable.
Now suppose aS violates III and there is some j⇤ such that ⇡iEi > ⇡j⇤Ej⇤ > ⇡jEj . Since
⇡j⇤Ej⇤ > ⇡jEj , by I there is some (j⇤, k) 2 o(aS). Then Ui(aS) = ⇡i⇡jEj , Uj⇤ = ⇡j⇤⇡kEk
and Uk = ⇡j⇤⇡kEj⇤ . If ⇡iEi > ⇡kEk then for a0i = j⇤ and a0j⇤ = i, Ui(a0{i,j⇤}, a
S
 {i,j⇤}) =
⇡i⇡j⇤Ej⇤ > Ui(aS) and Uj⇤(a0{i,j⇤}, a
S
 {i,j⇤}) = ⇡i⇡j⇤Ei > Uj⇤(a
S) and so aS is not stable.
If ⇡iEi  ⇡kEk then for a00i = k and a00k = i, Ui(a00{i,k}, aS {i,k}) = ⇡i⇡kEk > Ui(aS) and
Uk(a00{i,k}, a
S
 {i,k}) = ⇡i⇡kEi > Uk(a
S) and aS is not stable.
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1.5 Properties of equilibrium learning profiles
Having characterised the set of stable learning profiles in the previous section, the set
of learning profiles considered can now be expanded to cover all those which can re-
sult in equilibrium. The set of equilibrium learning profiles Ae, shares one important
characteristic with the set of stable learning profiles AS ; every learning cycle that forms
under any a 2 Ae is a 2-cycle. However, unlike stable learning profiles where the number
of 2-cycles is always maximised, the number of 2-cycles varies over di↵erent equilibria
anywhere between one and n2 if n is even or
n 1
2 if n is odd. Some examples of equilibria
are shown in Figure 4. This is not to say that any learning profile a which only produces
2-cycles is an equilibrium. The set of equilibria is characterised in Lemma 4 below. It
shows that not only is cycle size important, but whether or not a learning profile is an
equilibrium also depends on which objects the agents in B2(a) are investigating. Every
agent in B2(a) must be learning about the endowment of an agent in C2(a) who is in
a 2-cycle; there can be no ‘chains’ of agents not in learning cycles such as that shown
in Figure 6(a). It also matters which agents are in B2(a) and C2(a). If agents with
endowments of su ciently high potential value and probability of being acceptable are
not in 2-cycles then there may be an incentive for an agent already in a 2-cycle to create
an alternative 2-cycle or 3-cycle as shown in Figure 7.
Lemma 4. A learning profile a is an equilibrium if and only if all learning cycles are
2-cycles and for any agent b 2 B2(a) not in a learning cycle, there is some c 2 C2(a)
such that ab = c , ⇡bEb  ⇡acEac and ⇡cEc   ⇡c⇡bEb.
Proof. To see that in equilibrium every learning cycle is a 2-cycle consider a single m-
cycle (k, k0, k⇤, ..., k00) that forms between some S = {k, k0, k⇤, ..., k00} such that m   3
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2 3 4
(b) 
1 65
2 3 4
(c) 
1 65
1
(a) 
2
Figure 4: Examples of equilibria
and ⇡k⇤Ek⇤  ⇡iEi for all i 2 S 5. This is illustrated in figure 5(a). For agent k0:
Uk0(a) =
0@ Y
i2S\k⇤
⇡i
1A⇡k⇤Ek⇤
But for a0k0 = k:
Uk0(a
0
k0 , a k0) = ⇡k0⇡kEk
This is shown in figure 5(b). Since k0 2 S \ {k⇤}, ⇡k0 >
Q
i2S\k⇤ ⇡i. But then since
⇡k⇤Ek⇤  ⇡kEk, Uk0(a) < Uk0(a0k0 , a k0) and a cannot be an equilibrium.
Then if a is an equilibrium all learning cycles are 2-cycles which means no i 2 B2(a) is
in a learning cycle and so Ui(a) = 0 for all i 2 B2(a). Suppose there is some b 2 B2(a)
such that ab = b0 2 B(a) as in Figure 6(a). Then for some a0 such that a0b0 = b,
5If |S| = 3 then k⇤ = k00
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(a) 
(b) 
k k’ k’’ 
k k’ k’’ 
k* 
k* 
Figure 5: (a) The m-cycle (k, k0, k⇤, ..., k00) (b) The alternative 2-cycle (k, k0)
(b, b0) 2 o(a0b0 , a b0) as shown in Figure 6(b) and Ub0(a0b0 , a b0) = ⇡b0⇡bEb > 0 = Ub0(a).
But then a cannot be an equilibrium and so it must be that ai 2 C2(a) for all i 2 B2(a).
(a) 
b b’
(b) 
b b’
Figure 6: If a is an equilibrium then ai 2 C(a) for all i 2 B(a)
I next show that if all learning cycles are 2-cycles and ai 2 C2(a) for all i 2 B2(a),
then for any b 2 B2(a) such that ab = c 2 C2(a), ⇡bEb  ⇡acEac and ⇡cEc   ⇡c⇡bEb.
This means that no agent in a 2-cycle is able to attain greater utility by creating an
alternative 2-cycle or 3-cycle with any agent in B2(a). To see this, suppose that for
some b 2 B2(a) such that ab = c 2 C2(a), either ⇡bEb > ⇡acEac or ⇡cEc < ⇡c⇡bEb
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or both. Under a (as in Figure 7(a)), Uc(a) = ⇡c⇡acEac and Uac(a) = ⇡cEc. For
some a0 let a0c = a0ac = b. Under (a
0
c, a c), (b, c) 2 o(a0c, a c) (as in Figure 7(b))
and Uc(a0c, a c) = ⇡c⇡bEb. If ⇡bEb > ⇡acEac then Uc(a) < Uc(a0c, a c) and a is not
an equilibrium. Under (a0ac , a ac), (b, c, ac) 2 o(a0ac , a ac) (as in Figure 7(c)) and
Uac(a
0
ac , a ac) = ⇡ac⇡c⇡bEb. If ⇡cEc < ⇡c⇡bEb then Uac(a) < Uac(a
0
ac , a ac) and again, a
is not an equilibrium.
(a) 
b c ac
b c ac
b c ac
(b) 
(c) 
Figure 7: If a is an equilibrium then no i 2 C(a) can attain greater utility by
forming a cycle with any i 2 B(a)
It remains to be shown that a is an equilibrium if o(a) contains only 2-cycles and for every
agent b 2 B2(a) there is some c 2 C2(a) such that ab = c , ⇡bEb  ⇡acEac and ⇡cEc  
⇡c⇡bEb. Since all agents in C2(a) are in 2-cycles, Ui(a0i, a i) = 0 for all a0i 2 C2(a)\{ai},
i 2 N . Now consider all a0i 2 B2(a) for all i 2 B2(a). Since ai 2 C2(a) for all i 2 B2(a),
no i 2 B2(a) can form a cycle by learning about the endowment of any agent in B2(a) and
so Ui(a0i, a i) = 0 for all a0i 2 B2(a), i 2 B2(a). Since no i 2 B2(a) is in a learning cycle
under a, Ui(a) = 0 = Ui(a0i, a i) for all a0i 2 Ai, i 2 B2(a). Now consider all a0i 2 B2(a)
for all i 2 C2(a). Fix some c⇤ 2 C2(a) and a0c⇤ = b⇤ 2 B2(a). Let (c⇤, c0) 2 o(a) (as
in Figure 8(a) and (b)) so that Uc⇤(a) = ⇡c⇤⇡c0Ec0 . Under (a0c⇤ , a c⇤), c⇤ is either in a
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learning cycle or not. If c⇤ is not in a learning cycle then Uc⇤(a0c⇤ , a c⇤) = 0 < Uc⇤(a). If
c⇤ is in a learning cycle then it is either a 2-cycle (c⇤, b⇤) if ab⇤ = c⇤ (as in Figure 8(c))
or a 3-cycle (b⇤, c0, c⇤) if ab⇤ = c0 (as in Figure 8(d)). Since ai 2 C2(a) for all i 2 B2(a),
c⇤ cannot be in an m-cycle such that m > 3 under (a0c⇤ , a c⇤). If (c⇤, b⇤) 2 (a0c⇤ , a c⇤)
then U⇤c (a0c⇤ , a c⇤) = ⇡c⇤⇡b⇤Eb⇤ . Since ab⇤ = c⇤ and (c⇤, c0) 2 o(a), ⇡b⇤Eb⇤  ⇡c0Ec0 and
so Uc⇤(a)   Uc⇤(a0c⇤ , a c⇤). If (b⇤, c0, c⇤) 2 (a0c⇤ , a c⇤) then U⇤c (a0c⇤ , a c⇤) = ⇡c⇤⇡c0⇡b⇤Eb⇤ .
Since ab⇤ = c0 and (c⇤, c0) 2 o(a), ⇡c0Ec0   ⇡c0⇡b⇤Eb⇤ and so Uc⇤(a)   Uc⇤(a0c⇤ , a c⇤).
Then Ui(a)   Ui(a0i, a i) for all a0i 2 Ai, i 2 N and so a is an equilibrium.
(a) 
b* c* c’
(b) 
b* c’ c*
(c) 
b* c* c’
(d) 
b* c’ c*
Figure 8: (a) ab⇤ = c⇤, (b) ab⇤ = c0, (c) the 2-cycle (c⇤, b⇤) and (d) the 3-cycle
(b⇤, c0, c⇤)
Lemma 4 shows that many learning profiles which generate the maximum number of
2-cycles are also equilibria. This includes the stable set, AS .
Lemma 5. Any stable learning profile is an equilibrium and so AS ✓ Ae, where Ae is
the set of equilibrium learning profiles.
Proof. If n is even then by I all agents are in 2-cycles and Lemma 4 holds. If n is odd
then by I all agents are in 2-cycles with the exception of some i⇤ such that ⇡i⇤Ei⇤ =
mini2N ⇡iEi. Then ⇡i⇤Ei⇤  ⇡iEi for all i 2 N and ⇡i⇡j⇡i⇤Ei⇤ < ⇡i⇡jEj for all i, j 2 N
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and so Lemma 4 holds.
1.6 Ex-ante welfare
In Section 1.3 three approaches to the learning and matching problem were introduced.
Sections 1.4 and 1.5 characterised the set of stable and equilibrium learning profile
respectively but did not explore the di↵erent e↵ects on welfare. This section compares
the ex-ante welfare across those stable and equilibrium learning profiles and considers the
conditions under which a stable learning profile yields the highest ex-ante welfare possible
(in line with Approach 3 described in Section 1.3). To more easily distinguish between
di↵erent levels of ex-ante welfare, in what follows let the maximum possible ex-ante
welfare for any given set of objects beW ⇤ = maxa2AW (a). Focussing on what occurs in
equilibrium, let the maximum and minimum possible ex-ante welfare of any equilibrium
learning profile be WE = maxa2Ae W (a) and W e = mina2Ae W (a) respectively. The
set of equilibrium learning profiles that yield WE is AE = {a | a 2 argmaxa2Ae W (a)}.
A learning profile is an ex-ante welfare maximising equilibrium if and only if
a 2 AE .
The results presented here are strongly reliant on a number of crucial assumptions.
The first is that the distribution from which each Agent i draws their value for Object
k 6= i varies across objects but not across agents so that any Agent i will observe the
same distribution for any given Object k 6= i. This can be thought of as each agent
having access to the same public information on the object but further investigation is
required in order to determine more personalised information. The e↵ects of relaxing this
assumption are explored in Section 1.6.4. Secondly, the assumption that all agents learn
simultaneously is critical to the results in this section. Agents are time constrained and
do not have the capacity to wait and observe others’ actions over time. This assumption
is restrictive but it is to some extent relaxed and treated as a dynamic problem in Chapter
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2. Thirdly, each agent has only a single test and is unwilling to exchange for an untested
object. This means attention is restricted to those ‘high-stakes’ exchanges discussed
in Section 1.1. Expanding the learning capacity adds new dimensions to the problem
and an example illustrating some of the possible e↵ects to consider all illustrated in the
conclusion (Section 1.7). This section will also add one further assumption, that objects
are ‘well ranked,’ in order to compare ex-ante welfare maximisation across approaches.
The concept of well ranked objects applies when objects can be ranked in similar ways
regardless of whether one focusses on the acceptability or conditional value of an object.
It is explained further below, but the consequences of relaxing this assumption are given
in Section 1.6.3.
1.6.1 Well ranked objects
Objects are well ranked if their order is the same when ranked by either their accept-
ability or conditional values. Agent 1 is endowed with an object which not only has the
highest probability of being acceptable (⇡1   ⇡1 for all i 2 N) but also the highest con-
ditional value (E1   En for all i 2 N), while Agent 2 is endowed with an object which
has the same or next highest values of ⇡i and Ei and so on. More formally, objects are
well ranked if ⇡1   ⇡2   ...⇡n and E1   E2   ...En and strictly well ranked if
⇡1 > ⇡2 > ...⇡n and E1 > E2 > ...En. Whether objects are well ranked or strictly well
ranked ⇡1E1   ⇡2E2   ...⇡nEn holds and so all the results on stability and equilibrium
in Lemmas 1 to 5 and Observations 1 and 2 hold.
When objects are well ranked the relationship between the ex-ante welfare of all stable
learning profiles, WS , and the highest ex-ante welfare possible in equilibrium WE is
precise and straightforward: WS =WE .
Theorem 1. If objects are well ranked then the ex-ante welfare of any stable learning
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profile, WS, is equal to that of any ex-ante welfare maximising equilibrium, WE.
The full proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix A. The proof provided here in
Lemma 6 is only for the case of n = 4 strictly well ranked objects but it is su cient to
illustrate the key steps of the full proof in Appendix A. Restricting attention to only
four objects makes the proof more tractable, but the fact that objects are strictly well
ranked and the fact that n is even also somewhat simplify the proof. When objects
are strictly well ranked, the set of stable learning profiles AS is identical to the set of
ex-ante welfare maximising learning profiles AE . As such, the conditions that define
AS play a central role in the proof of Lemma 6. When objects are strictly well ranked,
⇡1E1 > ⇡2E2 > ...⇡nEn and so II trivially holds for any set of strictly well ranked
objects. For this reason, Lemma 6 refers only to conditions I and III. Restricting n to
an even number means that the part of condition I referring to odd values of n is also
trivially satisfied.
Lemma 6. When objects are strictly well ranked and n = 4, a is an ex-ante welfare
maximising equilibrium if and only if a 2 AS.
Proof. Let a⇤ 2 Ae. If a⇤ /2 AS then it must violate at least one of conditions I and III.
Condition I: If a⇤ is an equilibrium then by Lemma 4, o(a⇤) can only contain 2-
cycles and if it violates I then o(a⇤) contains only a single 2-cycle. Say {(1, 2)} =
o(a⇤) so that W (a⇤) = ⇡1⇡2(E1 + E2). Now suppose that under a , agents 3 and 4
form a second 2-cycle (as shown in Figure 9(b)) so that o(a ) = {(1, 2), (3, 4)}. Then
W (a ) = ⇡1⇡2(E1 + E2) + ⇡3⇡4(E3 + E4). By Lemma 4, a  is an equilibrium and since
W (a ) > W (a⇤), a⇤ /2 AE .
Then a⇤ must satisfy condition I which implies there are two 2-cycles in o(a⇤). When
n = 4 only the three learning profiles a  2 A , a0 and a00 illustrated in Figure 10 can
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31 2 4
C(a*) B(a*)
(a)
31 2 4
C(a*) B(a*)
(b)
Figure 9: Two learning profiles: (a) A single 2-cycle under a⇤ (b) Two
2-cycles under (a0{b,b0}, a
⇤
 {b,b0})
generate sets of two 2-cycles and so a⇤ 2 {a , a0, a00}. Note that since all agents are in
2-cycles in all three learning profiles, by Lemma 4, a , a0 and a00 are all equilibria.
Condition III: Since a⇤ satisfies I and a⇤ /2 A⇤, a⇤ must violate III. Of the three
learning profiles a , a0 and a00, only a  satisfies III and so a 2 {a0, a00}. Consider the
ex-ante welfare under a  and a0. If a⇤ 2 AE and a⇤ = a0 then since a  is an equilibrium,
ex-ante welfare under a0 must be at least as great as under a :
W (a0)  W (a )
⇡1⇡3(E1 + E3) + ⇡2⇡4(E2 + E4)   ⇡1⇡2(E1 + E2) + ⇡3⇡4(E3 + E4)
iiii⇡4(⇡2E2   ⇡3E3) + ⇡3(⇡1E1   ⇡4E4)   ⇡1(⇡2E2   ⇡3E3) + ⇡2(⇡1E1   ⇡4E4) (1)
However, since objects are well ranked, ⇡1 > ⇡2 > ⇡3 > ⇡4 and so (1) is a contradiction.
Then W (a0) < W (a ). The same argument can be applied mutatis mutandis to a 
and a00. Since a⇤ 2 {a0, a00} and W (a ) is strictly greater than both W (a0) and W (a00),
a⇤ /2 AE .
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3 41 2
(a)
3 41 2
3 41 2
(b)
(c)
Figure 10: Three learning profiles generating two 2-cycles: (a) a  (b)
a0 (c) a00.
Then if a⇤ is an ex-ante welfare maximising equilibrium it must satisfy both I and II and
so a⇤ 2 AS . Since AS = {a⇤} and a⇤ 2 Ae, a⇤ must be the ex-ante welfare maximising
equilibrium.
Though Lemma 6 only covers the case where n = 4 and objects are strictly well ranked,
the proof in appendix A which applies to any set of well ranked objects follows a similar
pattern. The key di↵erence is that when objects are well ranked (rather than strictly
well ranked) the set of stable learning profiles, AS , is only a subset of the set of ex-ante
welfare maximising equilibria, AE . This is demonstrated in Example 4.
Example 4: Four agents have a set of well ranked objects where ⇡1 = ⇡2 = ⇡3 = ⇡4 and
E1 > E2 > E3 > E4. Consider again the three profiles a , a0, and a00 shown in Figure
10. Ex-ante welfare for all three profiles is:
W (a ) =W (a0) =W (a00) = ⇡21(E1 + E2 + E3 + E4)
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Since ⇡1E1 > ⇡2E2 > ⇡3E3 > ⇡4E4 but (1, 3) 2 o(a0) and (1, 4) 2 o(a00), both a0 and
a00 violate condition III. Since a  does not violate III, a  is the sole learning profile in
AS = {a }. But since W (a ) =W (a0) =W (a00), AS ( AE .
In Example 4 the probability an object will be acceptable is identical across objects and
it is this feature which means that learning profiles which are not stable can be ex-ante
welfare maximising equilibria. For this reason, the full proof of Theorem 1 (in Appendix
A) utilises the set A⇤ ◆ AS to show that there may be a large set of ex-ante welfare
maximising equilibria but it always includes all stable learning profiles when objects are
well ranked. Since by Observation 1, A  ✓ AS , the ex-ante welfare of any stable learning
profile can be expressed as WE =WS =
P
i2N,i even ⇡i 1⇡i(Ei 1 + Ei).
To complete the picture of the relative position of WS , Theorem 2 compares the ex-ante
welfare of all stable learning profiles with that of the worst equilibria, W e and the high-
est ex-ante welfare that can be achieved over all learning profiles, W ⇤. To show that
WS is greater than the ex-ante welfare of some equilibria is not a complex task since
in contrast to stable learning profiles which maximise the number of 2-cycles, Lemma
4 has already shown that equilibria can exist even when there are many agents and
only a single 2-cycle. Whether a learning profile can yield a higher ex-ante welfare than
WE depends on the exact values of ⇡i and Ei for each object. As Lemma 8 will show,
sometimes these values are such that m-cycles other than 2-cycles can result in a higher
level of ex-ante welfare.
Theorem 2. When objects are well ranked, the ex-ante welfare of any stable learning
profile, WS, is at least as great as that of any equilibrium and may be less than the
maximum possible ex-ante welfare, W ⇤.
The proof of Theorem 2 is via Lemma 7 and Lemma 8.
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Lemma 7. If objects are well ranked, the ex-ante welfare of any stable learning profile,
WS is at least as great as that of the equilibrium with the lowest ex-ante welfare, W e
and strictly greater if there are more than three agents.
Proof. Fix some a  2 A . By Observation 1 and Lemma 2, A  ✓ AS . Then W (a ) =
WS6. If n > 3 then {(1, 2), (3, 4)} ✓ o . By Lemma 4, for the same set of agents there is
some equilibrium ae 2 Ae such that {(1, 2)} = o(ae) so that no agent in N \{1, 2} is in a
learning cycle. Since (3, 4) 2 o , Ui(A ) > 0 for i 2 {3, 4}. Then W (A ) =WS > W (ae)
and since W e = mina2AE W (a), W (ae)  W e.
Lemma 8. The maximum possible ex-ante welfare over all learning profiles, W ⇤ may
exceed that of any equilibrium so that W ⇤ > WE.
The proof of Lemma 8 is via Example 5, which demonstrates that the restriction to
2-cycles in equilibrium noted in Lemma 4 can also restrict ex-ante welfare. In Example
5, larger m-cycles result in higher ex-ante welfare.
Example 5. Suppose N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} with the following values of ⇡i and Ei:
i ⇡i Ei ⇡iEi
1 0.99 6 5.94
2 0.98 5 4.9
3 0.97 4 3.88
4 0.1 3 0.3
5 0.01 2 0.02
6 0.001 1 0.001
Consider the learning cycles that form under two learning profiles aE and a0: o(aE) =
{(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6)} and o(a0) = {(1, 2, 3), (4, 5, 6)}. Note that aE 2 A  so by Observa-
tion 1, Lemma 2 and Theorem 1, aE 2 AE .
Since o(a0) contains two 3-cycles, by Lemma 4 it cannot be an equilibrium. For the given
6In Lemma 6 this holds trivially since AS is a singleton. Lemmas 12 and 13 in Appendix A prove
WE = WS = W (a) for all a 2 AS and any set of well ranked objects.
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values:
W (aE) = (0.99 ⇤ 0.98)(6 + 5) + (0.97 ⇤ 0.1)(4 + 3) + (0.01 ⇤ 0.001)(2 + 1) = 11.35
W (a0) = (0.99 ⇤ 0.98 ⇤ 0.97)(6 + 5 + 4) + (0.1 ⇤ 0.01 ⇤ 0.001)(3 + 2 + 1) = 14.12
Since aE 2 AE , W (aE) =WE < W (a0) W ⇤.
Example 5 does not imply that a set of 3-cycles will always ex-ante welfare dominate a
set of 2-cycles. It occurs in Example 5 because the value of ⇡i for agents 4, 5 and 6 is so
low relative to agents 1, 2 and 3. In the three cycle (1, 2, 3) 2 o(a0), there is a very high
probability that all three agents will find the object they are learning about acceptable.
Since ⇡4 = 0.1 it is far less likely that that the learning cycle (3, 4) 2 o(aE) will result
in an exchange. Then under aE there is a high probability that only agents 1 and 2 will
exchange objects whilst the remaining four agents will keep their own endowments and
as such, W (aE) < W (a0).
1.6.2 When stable is best
Example 5 demonstrates that in order to maximise ex-ante welfare, it is sometimes nec-
essary to implement larger learning cycles than the 2-cycles to which all stable learning
profiles are restricted. It is, however, significant that the learning cycles in Example
5 are 3-cycles. Although there may be many 3-cycles under a learning profile which
maximises ex-ante welfare, as Lemma 9 shows, there can never be an m-cycle containing
more than three agents. A large m-cycle (as in Figure 11(a)) can always be broken into
at least one 2-cycle and one otherm-cycle (as in Figure 11(b)) to increase ex-ante welfare.
Lemma 9. Condition IVc: If W (a) = W ⇤, then o(a) contains no m-cycles such that
m > 3.
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(a) 
i* j*
(b) 
i* j*
S 
S \{i*,j*} 
Figure 11: Ex-ante welfare and large m-cycles. (a) An m-cycle between agents
in S, (b) The m-cycle broken into two smaller cycles.
Proof. Suppose o(a) contains an m-cycle between S ⇢ N agents such that m > 3 (as in
Figure 11(a)). The sum of the expected utilities of all agents in S is:
X
i2S
Ui(a) =
Y
i2S
⇡i
X
i2S
Ei
Under a0, let a 2-cycle form between agents i⇤, j⇤ 2 S and an (m  2)-cycle between all
agents in S \ {i⇤, j⇤} (as in Figure 11(b)) so that the sum of expected utility of agents
in S is: X
i2S
Ui(a
0
S , a S) = ⇡i⇤⇡j⇤(Ei⇤ + Ej⇤) +
Y
i2S\{i⇤,j⇤}
⇡i
X
i2S\{i⇤,j⇤}
Ei
Since ⇡i⇤Ej⇤ ,
Q
i2S\{i⇤,j⇤} ⇡i >
Q
i2S ⇡i, the sum of agents utility is higher under the two
cycles:
P
i2S Ui(a
0
S , a S) >
P
i2S Ui(a). All i 2 N \ S are in the same cycles under a
and (a0S , a S) and so
P
i2N\S Ui(a) =
P
i2N\S Ui(a
0
S , a S). Then
P
i2N Ui(a
0
S , a S) >
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P
i2N Ui(a) and so W (a
0
S , a S) > W (a).
It is also significant, in Example 5, that there is a large gap in the probability an object
will be acceptable between the best and worst three objects. Such large gaps in the
value of ⇡i are necessary in order for 3-cycles to feature in any ex-ante welfare max-
imising equilibrium. However, when the di↵erences in the probability two objects being
acceptable is su ciently small, sets of 2-cycles produce higher ex-ante welfare. Objects
are closely well ranked if objects are well ranked and ⇡i  ⇡i+3⇡i+1 for all i 2 N for which
there exists an agent i + 3 2 N . When n is even and objects are closely well ranked,
maximum ex-ante welfare can be achieved by learning profiles containing only 2-cycles.
This restriction to 2-cycles means that any stable learning profile yields not only the
highest ex-ante welfare of any equilibrium but also the highest ex-ante welfare of any
equilibrium. The case where n is odd is similar, with the exception that when the value
of ⇡n is high enough, it can be better to form a three cycle between three of the worst
agents rather than leave one agent not in any learning cycle at all.
Theorem 3. When objects are closely well ranked, if n is even then WS =W ⇤ and if n
is odd then either W ⇤ = WS or W ⇤ and WS di↵er only in the sum expected utilities of
three agents with the three worst endowments so that WS WE⇤ = ⇡n 2⇡n 1(⇡n(En 2+
En 1 + En) + En 2 + En 1).
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix B. It utilises a set of conditions similar to
I, II and III but allows for 3-cycles as well as 2-cycles. Two extra conditions are also
required. The first was given in Lemma 9 and restricts all learning cycles to 2-cycles
and 3-cycles. The second, given in Lemma 21 restricts the number of 3-cycles to at
most one. Collectively, these conditions show that when objects are closely well ranked,
stable learning profiles yield the maximum (or very close to the maximum) ex-ante
welfare.
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1.6.3 Ex-ante welfare without the well ranked assumption
If objects are not well ranked then whilst the characterisations of stable and equilibrium
learning profiles hold, the results regarding ex-ante welfare do not. It is still the case
ex-ante welfare of any stable learning profile lies between that of the worst and best
equilibria (W e and WE) but a key di↵erence is that the ex-ante welfare of any stable
learning profile may be strictly less than WE .
Theorem 4. For any given set of objects, the ex-ante welfare of any stable learning
profile is weakly greater than the lowest ex-ante welfare of any equilibrium, W e and may
be exceeded by the highest ex-ante welfare of any equilibrium, WE.
Proof. By Lemma 5, AS ✓ Ae and so W e  W (aS)  WE for all aS 2 AS . As when
objects are well ranked, if n > 3 thenW e < W (aS) for all aS 2 AS . To see this, fix some
aS 2 AS . By conditions I, II and III on AS , there is some cycle (c1, c2) 2 o(aS) such
that ⇡c1Ec1 = ⇡1E1 and ⇡c2Ec2 = ⇡2E2. By condition I, |o(aS)| > 2 and |C2(aS)|   4.
By Lemma 4, there is also some ae 2 Ae such that {(c1, c2)} = o(ae). Since Ui(aS) > 0
for all agents in learning cycles and |C2(aS)|   4, W (aS) > W (ae)  W e.
The fact that the ex-ante welfare of an equilibrium can exceed that of a stable learning
profile (in contrast to when objects are well ranked) is demonstrated through Example
6.
Example 6. Suppose N = {1, 2, 3, 4} with the following values of ⇡i and Ei7:
i Ei ⇡i ⇡iEi
1 500 0.2 100
2 200 0.4 80
3 100 0.6 60
4 50 0.8 40
7I would like to thank Maris Goldmanis for providing this example
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Note that since Ei and ⇡i are inversely related, the objects are not well ranked. Con-
sider the learning cycles that form under two learning profiles aS and aE : o(aS) =
{(1, 2), (3, 4)} and o(aE) 2 {(1, 3), (2, 4)}. Note that aS 2 A  so by Observation 1 and
Lemma 2, aS 2 AS . By Lemma 4, aE 2 Ae. Since (1, 3) 2 o(aE) and ⇡1E1 > ⇡2E2 >
⇡3E3, aE /2 AS as it violates condition III. For this set of agents:
W (aS) = (0.2 ⇤ 0.4)(500 + 200) + (0.6 ⇤ 0.8)(100 + 50) = 128
W (aE) = (0.2 ⇤ 0.6)(500 + 100) + (0.4 ⇤ 0.8)(200 + 50) = 152
Then W (aS) < W (aE) WE .
1.6.4 Non-identical ex-ante object values
It has been assumed throughout that all agents have the same ex-ante value for any given
object other than their own endowments. Without this assumption, the characterisations
of the set of stable learning profiles and the set of equilibria do not hold. In particular, if
f ik is non-identical across both agents and objects then, as the following example shows,
learning cycles larger than 2-cycles can exist in equilibrium.
Example 1: First suppose three agents, N = {1, 2, 3}, all disagree over which objects
are the most and least (ex-ante) desirable. Agent 1 knows she ex-ante prefers agent
2’s endowment to 3’s since E12 = 10 > E
1
3 = 1 and ⇡
1
2 = 0.9 > ⇡
1
3 = 0.1. Similarly,
agent 2 ex-ante prefers 3’s endowment and 3 ex-ante prefers 1’s: E23 = E
3
1 = 10 >
E21 = E
3
2 = 1 and ⇡
2
3 = ⇡
3
1 = 0.9 > ⇡
2
1 = ⇡
3
2 = 0.1. Then a1 = 2, a2 = 3 and a3 = 1
is an equilibrium (as shown in Figure 12(a)). Under a, Ui(a) = (0.9)3 ⇥ 10 = 7.29
for all i 2 N and Ui(a0i, a i) = 0.9 ⇥ 0.1 = 0.09 for all a0i 6= ai and i 2 N . Since
Ui(a) > Ui(a0i, a i) for all i 2 N , a0i 2 Ai, a is an equilibrium. Since there are only three
agents, Ui(a) > Ui(a0i, a i) for all i 2 N , a0i 2 Ai also implies a is stable. Furthermore
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P
i2N Ui(a) = 21.87 = maxa2AW (a).
1 2 n 3 
1 2 3 
(a) 
(b) 
n-1 
Figure 12: (a) A 3-cycle between all agents. (b) An n-cycle between all agents.
Example 1 demonstrates that not only can 3-cycles exist in both equilibria and stable
learning profiles, but that such learning profiles can also be ex-ante-welfare maximising.
This result is not restricted to 3-cycles. As the number of agents increases, so too does
the maximum possible cycle size. In fact, Example 3 demonstrates that for any n it is
possible to construct an n-cycle that can exist in equilibrium. To do this, I deviate from
the standard approach by first fixing an n-cycle between all agents and then finding
parameter values such that the n-cycle can indeed be maintained in equilibrium.
Example 3: For some N = {1, ..., n}, let ai = i + 1 for all i 2 N \ {n} and an = 1.
An n-cycle then forms between all agents as shown in Figure 12(b). Let the ex-ante
values of the objects be such that Eii+1 > E
i
i 1 > Eij and ⇡ii+1 > ⇡ii 1 > ⇡ij for all
j 2 N \ {i   1, i + 1}, i 2 N \ {1, n}. For agent 1, E12 > E1n > E1j and ⇡12 > ⇡1n > ⇡1j
for all j 2 N \ {2, n} and for agent n, En1 > Enn 1 > Enj and ⇡n1 > ⇡nn 1 > ⇡nj for all
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j 2 N \ {1, n   1}. Then Ui(a) = Eiai
Qn
i=1 ⇡
i
ai and Ui(a
0
i, a i)  Eii 1⇡ii 1⇡i 1i for all
a0i 2 Ai, i 2 N \{1} and U1(a01, a 1)  E1n⇡1n⇡n1 for all a01 2 A1. So for a su ciently large
En1 and E
i
i+1 for all i 2 N \ {n} and a su ciently small E1n and Eii 1 for all i 2 N \ {1},
Ui(a) > Ui(a0i, a i) for all a0i 2 Ai and so a is an equilibrium. Also by making En1 and Eii+1
for all i 2 N \{n} su ciently large and E1n and Eii 1 for all i 2 N \{1} su ciently small,
a can be made both stable and the ex-ante welfare maximising learning profile.
1.7 Conclusion
When the ability to acquire information is limited or prohibitively costly, it can inhibit
the function of the matching process. Mechanisms such as Gale’s Top Trading Cycles de-
spite possessing compelling properties such as individually rationality, Pareto optimality
and strategyproofness may not deliver the best or maximum number of matches when
information acquisition is endogenous. When each agent’s ability to learn is restricted
to just one other object then the need to design the learning and matching process is
sometimes limited. When objects are well ranked and su ciently similar (or closely well
ranked) then any stable learning profile yields the maximum ex-ante welfare possible.
The impact of relaxing some of the key assumptions has been examined in Section 1.6
but all the analysis presented here applies only to the case when learning is so limited
that each agent is only able to acquire information about a single object. To illustrate
some of the consequences of relaxing this assumption consider the agents and learning
profiles illustrated in Figure 13. Suppose that not only is Agent 1 endowed with the best
object but also the ability to investigate two other objects while the remaining agents
can each investigate only one. In Figure 13(a) both Agents 2 and 3 investigate Agent 1’s
endowment. Despite Agent 1 owning the best object, the chance Agent 2 will be able
to exchange for it depends in part on the outcome of Agent 1’s investigation into Agent
3’s endowment and vice versa for Agent 3. If instead, Agents 2 and 3 investigate each
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other’s respective endowments (as in Figure 13(b)) then the probability they are able
to trade depends only on the probability each of the objects are acceptable. In contrast
with the results presented in prior sections, stable learning profiles exist which do not
maximise ex-ante welfare and leave the agents with the best endowments and greatest
testing ability unable to trade. Increasing the learning capacity will require further un-
derstanding of the trade o↵ between the probability of acquiring an object and its value.
(a) (b)
1
2 3
1
2 3
Figure 13: Learning cycles when i⇤ can test two objects
47
.48
.CHAPTER 2:
All Together Now?
Information Acquisition over Time with
Unilateral Matching
2 paper2
2.1 Introduction
Performing scientific tests and investigations, seeking out compatible new work sched-
ules, or moving house can all involve substantial costs. So in one-sided matching markets,
where each agent looks to exchange their endowment, high research costs can impact the
information an agent acquires. In situations where the costs are so prohibitively high
that each agent can only complete one investigation, the choice over what to learn is a
critical one. This decision, however, may not necessarily be taken immediately; if the
agent has a window of time in which to form her preferences then she can choose exactly
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when she investigates. For example, consider a council house exchange programme8
and a set of families living in council homes trying to use such a scheme to move in
the summer school holiday break. Since investigating new potential homes is a costly,
time-consuming exercise, each family has only one weekend to completely dedicate to
viewing a property, researching local schools and transport options before submitting the
paperwork in time to formalise the exchange. Families cannot a↵ord to get the decision
wrong and move to an environment where they find themselves worse o↵. If this is the
case, then the family must decide not only which property to investigate, but when. This
leaves the family with two competing problems: Firstly, if Family A searches for a house
and commits to viewing it too quickly, although they may find a house they prefer, they
will not know which other families might prefer the Family A home and therefore which
exchanges are possible. In short, they may waste their viewing weekend on a property
they can never attain. Secondly, if Family A waits to see whether there will be other
families who like their home and which families they are, Family A may miss out on the
opportunity to exchange at the end of the summer altogether. It is therefore important
for Family A to consider not only which property they learn about, but when they do
so. Restricting attention to situations where there are only su cient resources (time,
money, opportunity etc.) to investigate one other property may seem extreme but it
need not be an unrealistic assumption since those relying on social housing schemes may
be more likely to be resource constrained.
This paper examines a model in which a finite set of agents, all with ex-ante identical
endowments, are each equipped with the resources to investigate one other agent’s en-
dowment. Each agent knows the value of their own endowment but wants to be certain
she prefers any object with which she commits to exchange. Agents may choose both
which object to learn about and when to conduct their investigation from amongst a
8In the UK, many local authorities, such as Brighton and Hove City Council or the Royal Borough
of Kensington and Chelsea run their own ‘mutual exchange schemes’ but privately run national schemes
such as ‘HomeSwapper’ and ‘Exchange Locata’ also exist.
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finite set of time periods (known here as learning periods). At the end of each learning
period agents declare their up to date preferences so that other agents know both which
tests were performed in that period and whether or not those tests were successful. At
the conclusion of the final learning period, agents’ endowments are exchanged using
their ex-post preferences in Gale’s Top Trading Cycles, the unique individually rational,
Pareto optimal and strategyproof mechanism for this preference domain (as discussed in
the introduction to Chapter 1). Under Gale’s Top Trading Cycles, agents are only able
to exchange for objects strictly preferred to their own and so the decision over what to
learn about and when a↵ects which exchanges can potentially be realised.
The previous paper (Chapter 1) showed that when agents and their objects are ex-ante
identical, the ex-ante welfare maximising equilibrium also attained (or came very close
to) the highest ex-ante welfare possible within the model. This ‘fully simultaneous’
equilibrium is not prohibited in the model explored here, agents are free to all learn
together in the same period if they choose to do so. However, a↵ording agents the
opportunity to learn at their choice of learning period presents other options. When all
agents learn simultaneously, it might result in many wasted investigations. If Agents 1
and 2 both test each other’s respective endowments at the same time, and either one of
those tests fails then both agents will be left unable to exchange. If instead Agent 2 waits
to see the results of Agent 1’s test then, if Agent 1’s test fails, she has the option to test
another object altogether. In this sense, the fewer tests performed in each period, the
more other agents can benefit from the information gathered in each test. This makes
‘fully sequential’ learning an attractive candidate learning pattern for agents.
Working against the ‘slow and steady’ nature of fully sequential learning, however, is
the pressure to not be left alone. Fully sequential learning requires, by definition, some
agent to be the last to learn. If that agent has already had their endowment successfully
tested by another agent then there is no problem, but the risk the last agent takes is
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that by the time they conduct their test, either all other agents have already identified
other agents to exchange with or expended their tests and had them fail. In such a
situation, the last agent will be left without a potential exchange partner, no matter
which object she tests. This possibility creates an incentive for that ‘last agent’ to
change her mind and instead, conduct her test in an earlier time period. For example,
if there are ten agents and each Agent i tests in the ith learning period then Agent
10 is the last to conduct her test. If instead she tests, say, Agent 9’s endowment in
the first period then, if the test is successful, she creates an incentive for Agent 9 to
test the object belonging to 10. This pressure, to not be left until last, prevents fully
sequential learning from arising in any equilibrium and causes multiple agents to choose
to test in the same period as others, despite the information lost in doing so. This
problem is similar to the well documented ‘unravelling’ phenomenon often observed in
matching markets, particularly those involved in the allocation of new graduates to
their first professional position (Roth and Xing, (1984)). In those two-sided matching
markets, firms (hospitals/law firms/sports teams etc.) looking to hire new workers are
often incentivised to make o↵ers to new potential workers earlier and earlier in their
education which can lead to ‘explosive’ o↵ers made as early as possible in the process
before all the information required which may a↵ect the quality of the match (eg. medical
training) is acquired.
This paper clearly builds on Chapter 1 and the literature discussed there. The most
relevant of those remain Bade (2015) and Harless and Manjunath (2018), on the topic of
endogenous information acquisition within matching problems. Bade (2015) examines a
two-sided matching problem, and the superior role of serial dictatorship when agents have
a choice over whether or not to acquire information. This does not apply to the model
discussed here since agents are unwilling to risk exchange with objects which they have
not investigated and the cost prohibits the number of investigations, not the extensive
choice over whether to investigate at all. The two sided, school assignment problem
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discussed in Harless and Manjunath (2018) is presented as a static learning problem
where agents simultaneously choose which single institution to investigate and focus on
welfare properties highlights the advantages of Gale’s Top Trading Cycles. Whilst more
uncommon in the matching field, sequential information acquisition can be found in other
areas of mechanism design. In voting models, for example, Gershkov and Szentes (2009)
determine the optimal voting mechanism, in the face of costly information acquisition, is
shown to be sequential and this makes obeying the central planner’s instructions optimal.
In the model discussed here, although fully sequential learning may be optimal from an
ex-ante welfare perspective, it cannot be enforced by a central planner due to the ‘last’
agent’s incentive to expend her test in an earlier period.
Dynamic mechanism design is explored in a variety of contexts, but largely concentrates
on a changing set of agents as they arrive and depart. Parkes (2007), for example,
defines an e cient mechanism appropriate for online auction environments where the
set of customers morphs over time. In matching, Bloch and Cantala (2013) and Kurino
(2014) use an overlapping generations models within two-sided assignment problems.
U¨nver (2010) proposes mechanisms for use in kidney exchange problems where the set
of available patients and donors evolves over time, although their preferences do not.
Bade (2017) proposes mechanisms for use in shift exchange problems with an infinite
number of agents who arrive over time and, though their preferences do not change, they
cannot be determined simultaneously. In contrast, the model discussed here applies to
a fixed set of agents whose preferences can change over time and are determined before
an exchange is executed.
This paper begins by defining the model in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 discusses the si-
multaneous learning equilibria that still persist, despite the option to learn over time.
Section 2.4 demonstrates why exchanges can only happen between at most two agents
in equilibrium and uses this to explain why the fully sequential learning pattern cannot
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occur in equilibrium. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Agents, Objects, Values
A set of agents N = {1, ...n} is each endowed with an object in K = {1, ...n} where
agent i is endowed with object i and n is even. The value of object k to agent i is !ik.
Each agent values his own object at 0 so if i = k then !ik = 0. Each agent knows she will
find an object belonging to another agent to be either ‘good’ with value v¯ or ‘bad’ with
value v, where v < 0 < v¯; if i 6= k then !ik 2 {v, v¯}. The ex-ante value of any Object k to
Agent i is such that it is less than i’s endowment: E(!ik) = pv¯+(1 p)v < 0. The vector
!i := (!i1, ...!
i
n) gives the value of each object k 2 K to agent i and ! := (!1, ...!n) is
the vector of values of each object to each agent. The set of all possible such vectors !
is the state space ⌦. The state ! 2 ⌦ is determined by the chance player c and is drawn
from a uniform distribution over ⌦. The probability i values some object k 6= i as ‘good’
under any ! 2 ⌦ is p = ⇡({! | !ik = v¯}). Since all states occur with equal probability, at
any given state agents’ values for objects are iid; in each state the value of one object k
to Agent i conveys no information to another Agent j 6= i about the value of any object
to j.
2.2.2 Learning and Preference Declaration
Over time, agents are able to learn about exactly one other object. As discussed in the
introduction to this chapter within the context of social housing, focus is restricted to
those individuals who are so resource constrained, either in terms of time, money or
opportunity that they are only able to take the opportunity to learn once. There is a set
of T = {t0, t1, ...t2n} time periods which begin with nature, c, in t0 drawing ! 2 ⌦ from
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a uniform distribution and then alternate between learning and preference declaration
periods. Period tr is a learning period if r is odd and a preference declaration period
if r is even. In every period tr where r 6= 0, all agents must take some action and so
the player correspondence, P : N ! H, is as follows: P(;) = c and P(h) = N for all
h 2 H \ {;}, where H is the set of histories. A history is a sequence of vectors of agents’
actions, where each vector am details the actions taken by players who move after the
history (aq)m 1q=1 . The length of history h is l(h) and since there are 2n+1 time periods,
h is terminal if and only if l(h) = 2n. Since all agents move after every nonterminal
history (with the exception of the initial history), all histories of length one or more
will be a state followed by a sequence of 1 ⇥ n vectors. The history h0 is a subhistory
of h = (aq)mq=1 if h
0 = (aq)m0q=1, where m0 < m. Agents are unaware of the state (and
therefore the values of any object other than their own endowment) selected by c, so
all h 2 H such that P(h) = N and l(h) = 1 are in the same information set. Agents
know that c draws ! from a uniform distribution over ⌦. Agents do observe each other’s
actions (other than c’s) and so all remaining information sets are singletons. Agent i’s
strategy is si and Si is the set of all possible strategies for Agent i. A strategy profile
is s = (si)i2N and the set of all strategy profiles is S = ⇥i2NSi. The set of actions
available to each i 2 N under the strategy profile s at any h 2 H \ {;} is Ai(s, h) and
ai(s, h) is the action taken by i at h under s. The vector of all actions taken by all i 2 N
at any h 2 H \ {;} under the strategy profile s is a(s, h).
Any h 2 H where l(h) is odd coincides with a learning period. Each agent is equipped
with a single test which can be used on any object and in the agent’s choice of learning
period. Then, in each learning period an agent can either choose to test some object
k 2 K \ {i} or choose option x, which is the option not to test an object at all. Since
each agent has only a single test, the actions available to Agent i after any given history
h depends on Agent i’s actions at any subhistory of h, as determined by s: Ai(s, h) =
{1, ...n, x} \ {i} if there is no subhistory hk of h such that l(hk) is odd and ai(s, hk) 6= x,
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and Ai(s, h) = x otherwise.
Any h 2 H where l(h) is even coincides with a preference declaration period. In such
a period, agents report their preferences over objects. Agent i’s transitive preference
relation at h under the strategy profile s is Ri(s, h) where kRi(s, h)k0 means agent i
weakly prefers object k to k0 and kPi(s, h)k0 implies kRi(s, h)k0 but not k0Ri(s, h)k.
Since E(!ik) < 0 for all i 6= k, note that before an agent has learned the value of any
object, iPi(s, h)k for all k 2 K \{i} and after an agent has learned the value of an object
there is at most one object such that iPi(s, h)k for all k 2 K\{i}. A preference profile at h
under the strategy profile s is R(s, h) = (Ri(s, h))i2N and the set of all preference profiles
is R. A preference chain is a vector of agents (i1, ..., im) such that ik+1Rik(s, h)ik for
all k < m. A preference cycle is a preference chain ob(s, h) = (i1, ..., im) such that
ik+1Rik(s, h)ik for all k < m and i1Rim(s, h)im. The set of agents in the preference cycle
ob(s, h) is  b(s, h).
2.2.3 Exchange and Equilibrium
The set of terminal histories is Z ⇢ H, where z 2 Z if and only if l(z) = 2n. When a ter-
minal history z 2 Z is reached, objects are exchanged according to agents’ preferences at
z, R(s, z). A matching is a bijection µ : N ! K and the set of all matchings isM. Under
any given strategy profile s and terminal history z, a matching is individually rational if
µ(i)Ri(s, z)i for all i 2 N and a matching µ0 Pareto dominates µ if µ0(i)Ri(s, z)µ(i) for all
i 2 N and µ0(i⇤)Pi⇤(s, z)µ(i⇤) for at least one i⇤ 2 N . If a matching is not Pareto domi-
nated then it is Pareto optimal. A mechanism, M : R!M is individually rational and
Pareto optimal if it always results in an individually rational and Pareto optimal match-
ing. A mechanism is strategyproof if M(R(s, z))(i)Ri(s, z)M(R0i(s, z), R i(s, z))(i) for
all i 2 N , r0i(s, z). The mechanism used to match agents to objects is Gale’s Top Trading
Cycles, GTT : R ! M, as it is the unique individually rational, Pareto optimal and
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strategyproof mechanism.9 GTT is executed as follows:
Step r: Each unmatched agent i points at his most preferred object under
Ri(s, z) from amongst all unmatched agents. Each object points at its owner.
At least one cycle forms. All agents in a cycle receive the object they are
pointing at and are removed. If at least one agent remains then proceed to
step r + 1. If not, then end.
Agent i may be indi↵erent between two objects k and k0, however, since the indi↵erence
occurs only between objects for which i strictly prefers her own endowment, it does
not a↵ect the mechanism’s function; if i strictly prefers her own endowment she will
always point at and be matched to her own object before having to choose between k
and k0.
Agent i’s expected utility under any given strategy profile s, Ui(s) depends on the
probability an agent is matched with a given object and the value of that object. The
probability an agent is matched with a given object is a↵ected only by the decision over
which object to investigate and not by which preferences to report. Since GTT is used
to decide the matching, and GTT is strategyproof10, it is a weakly dominant strategy
for all agents to truthfully report there preferences as at z. It is also a weakly dominant
strategy for agents to report their preferences truthfully in any preference declaration
period. Agents know which tests have been performed in each period so an agent cannot
deceive others to her own advantage by misrepresenting her true preferences if she has
yet to complete the test. If she has performed her test and found she prefers her own
endowment to the object she investigated then it is a weakly dominant strategy to report
her true preferences since the object she prefers ex-post is her own. If she has performed
her test and found she prefers the tested object to her own endowment then, since all
other objects are ex-ante identical, stating she prefers the tested object makes it both
9The proof in Bade (2019) applies to the domain R.
10As in Chapter 1, the proof in Bade (2019) also applies to the domain R discussed here.
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weakly less attractive for other agents to test the same object and weakly more beneficial
for the owner of the tested object (or the owner of the object at the end of the preference
chain) to reciprocate the test.
Since agents report their preferences truthfully, agents are either matched with their
own endowments (valued at 0) or a good object (valued at v¯). Given the strategy profile
s, the probability a terminal history z 2 Z is reached under which i is matched with a
good object is ⇡({z | GTT (R(s, z))(i)Pi(s, z)i}). So, given the strategy profile s, Agent
i’s expected utility is:
Ui(s) = ⇡({z | GTT (R(s, z))(i)Pi(s, z)i}) · v¯
Let H|h be the set of sequences h0 of vectors of agents’ actions for which (h, h0) 2 H.
Given Agent i’s strategy si, let si|h be the strategy i follows at each h0 2 H|h and
s|h the profile of strategies followed by all i 2 N at each h0 2 H|h. A strategy profile
s is a subgame perfect equilibrium if Ui(s|h)   Ui((s0i, s i)|h) for all s0i 2 Si, i 2 N ,
h 2 H \ (Z [ {;}).
2.3 Learning Together and Equilibrium
Giving agents the option to choose not only which object to investigate, but also when to
conduct that investigation a↵ords them the opportunity to wait and see others’ results
before expending their own test: All else being equal, it is less risky for Agent i to test
the endowment of an Agent j who is known to prefer i to j than an Agent j0 who has
yet to expend her test and form ex-post preferences. In this sense, reducing the number
of periods in which agents conduct tests simultaneously can lead to fewer wasted tests
and more informative investigations. However, despite the possible advantages of fully
sequential testing, a ‘fully simultaneous’ equilibrium remains in which all agents con-
58
duct their tests in the same period. Figures 14 and 15 show one such equilibrium. Both
figures show which objects each agent investigates in each of the n learning periods. In
Figure 14 (a), every agent learns about a di↵erent object in period t1. Figure 14 (b)
illustrates how when any one of those agents tries to investigate an alternative object
in that same period (in this case the endowment of Agent 2), then that agent cannot
possibly be included in any later preference cycle. Figure 15 shows a similar e↵ect when
Agent 2 tries to investigate in a later learning period t7; since all agents have expended
their test in the first learning period, the only agent that Agent 2 can match with is
Agent 1 no matter the period in which Agent 2 expends her test. Theorem 1 shows that
there is a fully simultaneous equilibrium for any number of agents and objects, n.
Theorem 5. There is an equilibrium in which all agents learn in the same learning
period.
Proof. Let S  ⇢ S be a set of strategy profiles where every agent learns about a di↵erent
object in the first learning period and in such a way that learning cycles contain no more
than two agents:
S  = {s | ai(s, h) = i+ 1 for i odd , ai(s, h) = i  1 for i even , l(h) = 1}
Since each agent only has one test to expend and all agents truthfully declare their
preferences, Ui(s ) = p2v¯ for all i 2 N , s  2 S . Now consider some s0i 2 Si such that
s0i 6= s i , for any s  2 S . Then, if l(h) = 1, either ai((s0i, s  i), h) 2 N \ {ai(s , h), i} (so
that i investigates a di↵erent object in the same period) or ai((s0i, s  i), h) = x (so that
i investigates an object in a di↵erent period).
First suppose ai((s0i, s  i), h) 2 N\{ai(s , h), i} (Figure 14 shows one example where i = 2
and a2((s02, s  2), h) = 3). If i chooses to learn about some object other than ai(s , h)
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t11
(a) (b)
Figure 14: Fully simultaneous equilibrium - Deviation within period.
Objects investigated in each learning period under the strategy profiles
(a) s  and (b) (s02, s  2).
at h then, regardless of whether i values ai((s0i, s  i), h) as either good (v¯) or bad (v),
there can be no preference cycle containing both i and another agent j 6= ai(s , h) at
any history. Since agents reveal their preferences truthfully, i will be matched with her
own endowment. This means Ui(s0i, s  i) = 0 < p2v¯.
Now suppose ai((s0i, s  i), h) = x (Figure 15(b) shows Agent 2 choosing to instead inves-
tigate 4 in t7). Under (s0i, s  i), all j 2 N \ {i} expend their test in the first learning
period and so there is no (h, h0) 2 H and no j 2 N \{ai(s , h)} such that iPj(s , (h, h0))j.
Since agents reveal their preferences truthfully, i can never be matched with any j 2
N \ {i, ai(s , h)} and so under any strategy profile (si, s  i) where si 2 Si, ai(s , h) is the
only object Agent i can match with (besides i’s own endowment): Ui(s0i, s  i) = 0 for all
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Figure 15: Fully simultaneous equilibrium - Deviation across periods.
Objects investigated in each learning period under the strategy profiles
(a) s  and (b) (s02, s  2).
ai((s0i, s  i, ·) = j. Regardless of the history at which i tests ai(s , h), Ui(s0i, s  i) = p2v¯
and so s  is an equilibrium.
2.4 Learning Apart and Equilibrium
When the opportunity to learn over time exists, from an ex-ante welfare perspective it is
wasteful for all learning to take place simultaneously in the same period; ex-ante welfare
(the sum of all agents’ expected utilities) is higher if Agent i can wait to first see whether
another agent’s test of i’s endowment is successful or not. But can the rush to learn
together be halted? Do equilibria exist where agents patiently wait their turn in order to
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take full advantage of the information on o↵er? While agents may learn over more than
one period in equilibrium, Theorem 6 shows that there is no ‘fully sequential’ equilibrium
in which only one agent plans to learn in each period. Before turning to Theorem 6, it
is first necessary to establish the limits of preference cycle size in equilibrium.
2.4.1 Preference Cycles in Equilibrium
It is not a coincidence the proof of Theorem 5 utilised an equilibrium in which each
preference cycle contained exactly two agents; Lemma 10 shows that in equilibrium no
preference cycle contains more than two agents.
Lemma 10. In equilibrium, preference cycles are comprised of at most two agents.
The proof of Lemma 10 can be found in Appendix E, but the key features of the argument
are illustrated here for the case where n = 4, in Example 1. Though in this example a
single large preference cycle is considered, Lemma 10 applies to all incidences of ‘large’
preference cycles comprised of three or more agents.
Example 4: Let n = 4 and s be a strategy profile under which a preference cycle forms
between all four agents. The following four cases illustrate the argument as to why s
cannot be an equilibrium.
Case 1: Two or more agents learn in the same period, completing a preference cycle in
the next period.
Suppose that under the strategy profile s two agents both learn in the same period and
this results in a preference cycle in the next period. Figure 16(a) shows Agents 1 and 3
both learning in period t7. The preference cycle which results in t8 is shown in the box.
In order for the preference cycle shown in Figure 16(a) to form, both Agent 1’s test of 2
and Agent 3’s test of 4 must be successful and so U3(s|h) = p2v¯, where h is the history
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which coincides with the learning period t7 illustrated in Figure 16(a).
1 2 3 4
t1
t3
t5
t7
t8
(a) (b)
1 2 3 4
Figure 16: Example 4 - Case 1. Objects investigated in each learning
period under the strategy profiles (a) s and (b) (s03, s 3). The box
shows the preference cycle that results in the preference declaration
period, t8.
If the preference cycle shown in Figure 16(a) forms at t8, it must be that Agent 2 found
Agent 3’s endowment to be good: w23 = v¯. Now consider s
0
3 such that in t7 Agent 3 tests
Agent 2’s endowment as in Figure 16(b). In order to be in a preference cycle, Agent 3 only
needs her single test of Object 2 to be successful. Then U3((s03, s 3)|h) = pv¯ > U3(s|h)
and so s is not an equilibrium.
Case 2: Two or more agents learn in the same period, extending a preference chain but
not a preference cycle in the next period.
Suppose under s two agents both learn in the same period and this ‘extends’ a preference
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chain but does not create a preference cycle in the next period. Figure 17(a) shows agents
2 and 3 both learning in period t5, extending the preference chain started by Agent 1 in
t1. The preference cycle shown in the box is not complete at t6 because Agent 4 has not
yet expended her test. In order for the preference cycle to form, every test conducted
by agents 2, 3 and 4 must be successful. Then U3(s|h) = p3v¯, where h coincides with
t5.
If the preference cycle shown in Figure 17(a) forms at t8, it must be that Agent 2
found Agent 3’s endowment to be good at t5: w23 = v¯. Now consider s
0
3 such that in
t5 Agent 3 instead tests Agent 2’s endowment. In order to be in a preference cycle,
Agent 3 only needs two tests (those shown in t5 of Figure 17(b)) to be successful. Then
U3((s03, s 3)|h) = p2v¯ > U3(s|h) and so s is not an equilibrium.
Case 3: Two or more agents learn in the same period, but neither extend a preference
chain, nor create a preference cycle in the next period.
Suppose two or more agents learn in the same period, but neither extend a preference
chain, nor create a preference cycle in the next period. Figure 18(a) shows one such
example where Agents 1 and 3 both investigate di↵erent objects in t1. If the large
preference cycle is to be realised in t8 then at some time period after t1, the ‘gaps’
in the preference cycle must be completed: Agent 2 and Agent 4 must also complete
their investigations. Consider Agent 2, the penultimate agent to expend her test. Since
she is the penultimate agent she extends the preference chain started by Agent 1 in
t1 but since Agent 4 is yet to expend her test, the preference cycle is also not yet
complete. In this case U2(s|h)  p2v¯, where h coincides with t3. This leaves Agent 2
in a similar situation to that described in Case 2: For s02 such that a2((s02, s 2), h) = 1,
U2((s02, s 2)|h) = pv¯ > U2(s|h) (as shown in Figure 18(b)).
Case 4: One agent learns in each period
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Figure 17: Example 4 - Case 2. Objects investigated in each learning
period under the strategy profiles (a) s and (b) (s03, s 3). In period
t5, Agents 2 and 3 extend the preference chain started by Agent 1 in
t1. The box shows the preference cycle that results in the preference
declaration period, t8.
If exactly one agent learns in each period then, in order for the large preference cycle to
form, there must be one or more occasions where an agent extends an existing preference
chain but does not complete the preference cycle. Any such agent has a profitable
deviation from s. Figure 19(a) shows an example where only one agent learns in each
learning period. The penultimate agent to expend her test is Agent 3 and in doing so she
creates a preference chain with Agent 1 but does not complete the cycle as Agent 4 has
yet to expend her test. So U2(s|h)  p2v¯, where h coincides with t5. However, if Agent 2
instead chooses to learn about Agent 1’s endowment then since at t5 it is already known
that Agent 1 strictly prefers Agent 2’s endowment, for s02 such that a2((s02, s 2), h) = 1,
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t3
t5
t7
t8
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1 2 3 4
Figure 18: Example 4 - Case 3. Objects investigated in each learning
period under the strategy profiles (a) s and (b) (s02, s 2). In period t3,
Agent 2 has an incentive to create a smaller preference cycle rather
than completing the three-agent preference chain. The box shows the
preference cycle that results in the preference declaration period, t8.
U2((s02, s 2)|h) = pv¯ > U2(s|h) (as shown in Figure 19(b)).
Chapter 1, Section 1.5 discussed a much broader range of objects than are currently
being considered; in Chapter 1 objects were not necessarily ex-ante identical but never-
theless the restriction on cycle size is similar in both the simultaneous (Chapter 1) and
dynamic (Chapter 2) setting. The fact that objects are ex-ante identical is not driving
the conclusion of Example 4; similar statements could be made about the dynamic set-
ting even if the ex-ante value of objects di↵ers. If we assume (as in Chapter 1) that agent
i is endowed with the ith best endowment and that objects are well ranked (as in Section
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Figure 19: Example 4 - Case 4. Objects investigated in each learning
period under the strategy profiles (a) s and (b) (s02, s 2). In period t5,
Agent 2 has an incentive to create a smaller preference cycle. The box
shows the preference cycle that results in the preference declaration
period, t8.
1.6.1) then it leaves Agents 1 and 2 in very influential positions. If they do not learn
about each other’s respective endowments then it gives the agents who the objects they
do investigate the incentive to reciprocate the investigation and create a 2-cycle. If either
Agent 1 investigates Agent 2’s endowment or Agent 2 investigates Agent 1’s endowment
then the owner of the investigated object is incentivised to reciprocate the investigation
in a later period. If, for example, Agent 2 test Agent 1’s object in the first period and
the test proves unsuccessful then Agents 1 and 3 become the two best remaining objects
and similar logic applies as for Agents 1 and 2. All the deviations illustrated in Figures
31 to 19 would also be true in the strictly well ranked environment.
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2.4.2 Fully Sequential Learning in Equilibrium
Lemma 10 dictates that preference cycles contain at most two agents in equilibrium,
but it does not determine the period in which each preference cycle first forms. Whilst
Theroem 5 proved that a fully simultaneous equilibrium does exist in which agents all
learn in the same period, it is not necessarily the most desirable outcome as agents’
are unable to use information learned by other agents to inform their own choice of
investigation. A ‘fully sequential’ learning pattern would allow agents to learn slowly
and steadily, thereby avoiding wasting tests on objects with which they know they will
be unable to exchange. Whilst for the majority of agents this leads to higher expected
utility than under fully simultaneous learning, it does create one victim. The final agent
to execute her test may be left in the unfortunate position of having no potential part-
ners with which to trade. Figure 20(a) shows how the failed tests of Agents 1, 2 and 3
(indicated by the dashed arrows) led to a preference cycle forming between Agents 4 and
5. If Agent 6 conducts his test in t11 then he cannot hope to exchange for any object at
all. However, if Agent 6 instead chooses to test in the first period, t1 then it is a weakly
dominant strategy for Agent 5 to investigate Agent 6’s endowment as shown in Figure
20(b). Theorem 6 provides a more formal argument.
Theorem 6. There is no equilibrium in which only one agent plans to learn in each
period: If s is an equilibrium and n   2 then there is at least one learning period in
which multiple agents learn.
Proof. Let s be an equilibrium such that in each of the m learning periods, only one
agent performs a test on another object. Let i⇤ be the last agent to expend her test,
which she does at h⇤, then Aj(s, h⇤) = {x} for all j 2 N \{i⇤}. Since, by Lemma 10 there
are no large cycles in equilibrium, Ui⇤(s)  p2v¯. Since each agent finds another object
to be ‘good’ only with probability p < 1, under s it is possible that all tests conducted
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t12
Figure 20: Problems in fully sequential learning. Solid arrows indicate
successful tests and dashed arrows indicate failed tests. The box shows
the preference cycles in the preference declaration period t12.
by other agents fail if !jaj(s,·) = v for all j 2 N \ {i⇤}, in which case i⇤ will not be able
to form a preference cycle with any agent other than herself and so Ui⇤(s) < p2v¯.
Suppose instead that under s0i⇤ , ai⇤(s0i⇤ , h1) = j⇤ where h1 occurs in the first learning
period and there is no j 2 N such that aj(s, h1) = j⇤. Suppose !i⇤j⇤ = v¯ and consider
j⇤’s decision at h1. Since i⇤ is the only agent to investigate j⇤ at h1, if aj⇤(sˆj⇤ , h1) =
i⇤ for some sˆj⇤ 2 Sj⇤ then Uj⇤(sˆ|h1) = pv¯. If aj⇤(sˆ, h1) 2 (N \ {i⇤, j⇤}) [ {x} then
Uj⇤(sˆ|h1)  p2v¯ < pv¯. Since s is an equilibrium, it must be that aj⇤(sj⇤ , h1) = i⇤. But
then Ui⇤(s0i, s i) = p2v¯ > Ui⇤(s).
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2.5 Conclusion
Giving agents the opportunity to learn over a certain time period does not necessarily
reduce wasteful learning. The threat of being left until last, with no option to exchange,
prevents agents from taking full advantage of the information which can be gathered
through sequential learning. This results in agents learning together in the same time
periods and allows fully simultaneous learning as a possible equilibrium. Since the model
presented here did not use discount factors, the pressure to ‘learn together’ is not linked
to the need to learn fast, before their utility of an object is eroded. The fact that
agents are all ex-ante identical, however, is likely playing a critical role. If one agent
was thought to have an object with a much higher ex-ante value than others, agents
may find it advantageous to wait and see if exchange with such an agent is possible.
Di↵erent ex-ante values would also play a role whenever an agent is fortunate enough
to have more than one agent interested in her endowment. In the model presented, a
tie breaking rule is needed to determine how an agent chooses between two identical
agents, but if objects are ex-ante di↵erentiable then the agent’s choice over which object
to learn about is perhaps more clear. When each agent has the capacity for only one
test, this would not necessarily prevent the fully simultaneous learning taking place in
equilibrium, but it may a↵ect the number of periods in which such learning can take
place.
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.CHAPTER 3:
UCAS: Prizes for Some
Short Lists, Unknown Grade and Assortative
Matching
3 Paper3
3.1 Introduction
The Universities and College Admissions Service (UCAS) runs the UK’s centralised uni-
versity application process. With the exception of a select few private courses, entry
to all UK institutions is conducted through UCAS; In 2017, UCAS processed over 2.5
million applications on behalf of almost 700000 students11. The design of such a pro-
cess is critical to ensuring an e cient match, with the ‘correct’ students being placed at
each institution. Students may have individual preferences but assortative matching is
11See https://www.ucas.com/about-us/who-we-are [accessed 01/11/18]
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desirable with the students achieving the highest grades attending the most prestigious
institutions. The ‘gold standard’ in college admissions, deferred acceptance, has been a
staple mechanism of matching markets since the field’s nascent paper of Gale and Shap-
ley (1962). Deferred acceptance is appealing because it produces stable outcomes and
because it makes telling the truth about one’s preferences a dominant strategy (Dubins
and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982b)). The conditions which ensure these features
are realised include firstly, that both students and colleges know their preferences over
all the members of the opposite set and secondly that they are able to report those
preferences. Neither of these features is present in the UCAS system. Students applying
through UCAS must do so before they know their school exam results. This information
is acquired only after their application has been submitted but before the universities
make their decisions. UCAS also limits students to reporting their preferences over only
two colleges (known as ‘firm’ and ‘insurance’ choices). Although it remains a dominant
strategy to tell the truth about their preferences over the two chosen colleges, the com-
bination of unknown grades and short preference lists prevents students from reporting
honestly about which two colleges are their most preferred. As a result, students must be
strategic about which two options they choose and this, in turn a↵ects the assortativity
of the final assignment, where the most able students are not able to access the high
performing institutions.
This paper explores a model where a set of students are assigned to a set of colleges12
through a student-proposing deferred acceptance style mechanism that di↵ers from the
canonical Gale-Shapley mechanism in two key aspects. Firstly, the colleges’ preferences
are determined by a students grades and while this information is known when the assign-
ment is made, students do not know their grades at the time of application. Students
learn their grades only after submitting preferences over colleges. Secondly, students
12I use the terms ‘college’ and ‘university’ interchangeably throughout to mean a higher education,
degree awarding institution
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must choose to express their preference over only two colleges by selecting a first ‘firm’
choice and a second ‘insurance’ choice to be used in case they are unsuccessful in securing
a place at the first. To see that this corresponds to the UCAS system used in the UK,
see Figure 21 which shows the decision faced by a UK student in the 2016/17 application
cycle. Students may invite conditional o↵ers from up to five universities. These o↵ers
will only be honoured if a students meets the conditions on A level grades (For example,
in Figure 21 the student must attain three A grades at A level13 to attend King’s College
London and one A and two B grades at A level to attend the University of East Anglia.
However, from amongst any o↵ers they receive from those five universities, they must
choose one firm and one insurance choice (see the ‘your reply’ column in Figure 21).
Furthermore, they must do so not only before they know which grades they will receive
but before they have even sat the majority of their exams.
Figure 21: A student’s UCAS in the 2016/17 application cycle.
13The final exams to be taken at the high school level for the majority of 18 year olds are known as
Advanced Levels or, more commonly, A Levels.
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Using a model with both unknown grades and short preference lists permits exploration
of how this a↵ects the final allocation of students to universities. Theorem 7 demon-
strates that unknown grades and short lists need not necessarily lead to an ex-ante
undesirable outcome. When various parameters such as college capacity and students’
preferences are set at the right level, the UCAS style system can produce the same
outcome as would be expected under the student-proposing deferred acceptance mech-
anism. However, this result is very sensitive to the parametric assumptions. When stu-
dents become more risk averse, the assortative matching can deteriorate, with the better
universities missing out on some of the better students and some students remaining
unassigned altogether. Increasing student capacity can benefit the best students and
colleges but leave a large proportion of students not assigned to any college. Such e↵ects
are concerning as it not only prevents students life outcomes (Belfield et al. (2018))
and universities’ ability to plan but if the strategic decision requires expert informa-
tion then the strategic complexity may impact low income groups who are already at a
disadvantage (Jerrim (2013)).
The college admissions problem has been considered from a number of di↵erent angles,
an overview can be found in Pathak (2011). Short lists are a concern in a number
of matching markets. Cseh et al. (2016) find mechanisms for use in the roommates
problem with short lists and Immorlica and Mahdian (2005) focus on stability in the
marriage problem when one side of the market must submit short preferences lists and
find that under such circumstances, agents are unlikely to have more than one stable
partner. Beyhaghi et al. (2017) look at the e↵ects of short lists on doctors’ choices
and social welfare in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). They focus on
where individuals apply and the extent to which ‘safe’ options are chosen and find that
the Nash equilibrium outcome is not drastically di↵erent to the optimal one. Unlike the
UCAS style system discussed here, however, all agents (both doctors and hospitals) have
all the required information before an application is processed. In addition, social welfare
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is considered as the sum of agents utilities from their assignments and are not concerned
with the assortative quality. Chade et al. (2014) look at the portfolio choice problem
students face when they are uncertain about a college preferences and the number of
applications is a choice limited by cost rather than the system itself. They find the
portfolio choice problem can cause sorting to fail.
Closely related to the unknown grades problem is the early admissions problem in the
US college market. Avery and Levin (2010) focus on the student’s response to the
possibility of early action and the positive benefits of allowing students to signal their
preferences. The combination of the unknown grades and short list problems are known
to cause adverse e↵ects in school matches. Ajayi and Sidibe (2017) analyse the complex
school match in Ghana and suggest changes to improve their measure of student wel-
fare. Common with UCAS, the Ghana school match used both short lists and students
were unaware of their priorities at each school at the time of application. The authors
recommend increasing the length of the preference lists as well as informing students of
their test scores in order to improve welfare. Such solutions are di cult to apply directly
to UCAS due to the fact that students submit their rankings before even sitting their
exams. Rectifying this would involve more than a change to the application mechanism,
but a full restructure of the final year of secondary school. Extending the list would be
simple to implement but it also creates high levels of uncertainty for universities. In the
Ghanaian school match problem, each school can expect a number of students within
a given range and the teaching needs will be uniform across the intake. By contrast,
universities using the UCAS system need to be able to predict whether a course will be
100% or 10% full and plan resources accordingly. Given the match takes places often
with six weeks of the start of teaching, it is di cult to acquire the correct resources and
hire the correct sta↵ at the eleventh hour.
The education system UCAS operates within does pose many seemingly immovable ob-
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stacles (such as short lists and unknown grades) but the concern over the lack of assor-
tativity in the match is also a concern from the point of view of widening participation.
Even when a strategyproof mechanism is used, students sometimes do not truthfully
report their preferences. Artemov, Che and He (2017) show that when students believe
there is little chance of being accepted to the best colleges then those colleges are likely
to be omitted from their lists. This becomes concerning when it may not only be the
academically less able students adopting such behaviour but when students from more
disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely to apply this strategy. Chen and Pereyra
(2018) find that students from low socio-economic backgrounds are more likely to decide
to deliberately misreport their preferences and not list the most aspirational schools. As-
sessing the possible outcomes of the UCAS mechanism may then be key in determining
how to aid students most likely to be disadvantaged by the strategic complexity.
Section 3.2 introduces a simple model which can be used to analyse the problems of
short lists and unknown grades with a UCAS type mechanism. Section 3.3 then uses
this model to tentatively explore some of the factors which influence the outocme of the
mechanism such as university capacity and quality of education at a given institution
and presents some conditions under which the ex-ante performance of UCAS is the same
as the ex-ante outcome of deferred acceptance.
3.2 Model
A continuum of students N = [0, 1], are to be assigned to one of four college options in
the finite set X = {A,B,C,?}, where A, B and C are all colleges and being assigned to
the ‘null’ college, ?, is equivalent to not being assigned to a college. All students agree
college A is the best and college C the worst and so if  i is i’s transitive preference
relation, A  i B  i C for all i 2 N . The utility any student i receives from attending
college x is Ui(x), where U(A) > U(B) > U(C) > U(?). Each student receives a grade
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from the set G = {1, 2, 3}, where colleges regard 1 to be the best grade and 3 the worst.
The probability any student receives a grade g 2 G is P (g). The grades are drawn from
a uniform distribution and so P (1) = P (2) = P (3). Each college x 2 X has capacity
qx. Since all colleges agree on which grade is the best, all colleges strictly prefer grade 1
students to grade 2 students and grade 2 students to grade 3 students but are indi↵erent
between students with the same grade. Each college x prefers to be full to capacity qx
than not and so prefers a student with any grade to having spare capacity.
A matching is a function µ : N ! X and the set of all possible matchings is M. The
match is conducted through the following three-stage process:
Stage 1 - Application
Students submits a college application prior to receiving their grades. Each stu-
dent lists two colleges on the application: a firm choice and an insurance choice.
Each agent i 2 N chooses an application strategy si from from the set S =
{AB,AC,BC}, where si = x1x2 means x1 is i’s firm choice and x2 is i’s insurance
choice college.
Stage 2 - Grades
Students learn their grades. Student i’s grade will be visible to any college receiving
her application in the assignment stage.
Stage 3 - Assignment
– Step 1: Students applications are sent to their firm choice college. Each
college considers all the applications it receives. If the number of applica-
tions to college x exceeds qx then x tentatively accepts its most preferred qx
applicants. If the number of applications to college x is qx or less then x
tentatively accepts all applicants. If all students are tentatively accepted to
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a college then the process terminates, otherwise continue to Step 2.
In general, at step k:
– Step k: The applications of any student rejected from their insurance choice
college in Step k   1 are accepted by the null college ?. The applications of
any students rejected from their firm choice college in Step k   1 are sent to
their insurance choice college. Each college considers all the new applications
it receives in Step k alongside the applications of the students it tentatively
accepted in the Step k  1. If the number of applications to college x exceeds
qx then x tentatively accepts its most preferred qx applicants. If the number of
applications to college x is qx or less then x tentatively accepts all applicants.
If all students are tentatively accepted to a college then the process terminates,
otherwise continue to Step k + 1.
The strategy profile s = (si)i2N details the strategy chosen by each student. The set
of all possible strategy profiles is S. Stage 3 above describes the assignment mechanism
M : S ! M. The mechanism M is closely related to the canonical student-proposing
deferred acceptance mechanism, (Gale and Shapley (1962)). Any di↵erence here between
M and deferred acceptance is driven by the limit on the number of colleges to which
a student can apply; under M a student is only permitted to send their application to
two colleges whereas under deferred acceptance, a student would be permitted to send
their application to all colleges the student prefers to being left unassigned at the null
college. This means that whilst the number of tentative matches and steps may be very
large under deferred acceptance, the assignment mechanism M will terminate after at
most four steps.
Under a given strategy profile s, the mass of students adopting strategy si 2 S is
m(si), where m(AB) +m(AC) +m(BC) = 1. Note that the set S implies no student
will be able to choose a strategy where they list a college they prefer less than their
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insurance choice as a firm choice. Such a strategy could never be advantageous to the
student choosing it since in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanisms it is a
dominant strategy for students to be truthful about their order of preferences (Dubins
and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982)). So while students may carefully consider which
two colleges they should send their application to, it is assumed they will always send it
first to their most preferred college of the two.
The college x a student is assigned to depends on both the mass of students adopting
each strategy and the grade they each receive. Since all students are ex-ante identical,
the probability student i is assigned to college x given their choice of strategy si is
P (x | si). The probability student i is assigned to college x given their choice of strategy
si and having received grade g is P (x | si, g). These probabilities determine the expected
utility ui(si) of an agent who adopts some strategy si 2 S. Agent i’s expected utility of
strategy si = x1x2 2 S is:
ui(x1x2) = P (x1 | x1x2)U(x1) + P (x2 | x1x2)U(x2) (2)
Since preferences over colleges and their utilities are the same for all agents, ui(x1x2) =
u(x1x2) for all i 2 N .
3.3 Comparative Statics
Using the model in Section 3.2, it is possible to explore factors a↵ecting both students
application strategies and the assortativity of resulting match. In particular, I focus
on two factors relevant to the changing UK higher education system in 2018. Firstly,
I examine the possible impact on assortativity when one university is considered to be
of disproportionately higher quality than the remainder and secondly, the possible im-
pact on assortativity when universities expand their capacity. Before turning to these
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questions, however, it is necessary to first establish what happens in the model at equi-
librium.
3.3.1 Equilibrium
In equilibrium it must be that the case that the expected utility of each application
strategy is the same and that the total number of students choosing each strategy is
equal to the total mass of students:
u(AB) = u(AC) = u(BC) (3)
m(AB) +m(AC) +m(BC) = 1 (4)
Determining the values of u(AB), u(AC) and u(BC) is a complex task and so it is
necessary to make some assumptions about how agents might behave in equilibrium.
This has the benefit of allowing us to examine what sort of behaviour might arise in
equilibrium but it is important to state that this is only one equilibrium out of many
given that the following assumptions may not hold:
(i) Firstly, it is assumed that the top ranked college is filled to capacity with
students. If places were otherwise left unfilled, some students would be able to
benefit by changing their strategy. College A, therefore, is assumed to receive at
least qA applications and its capacity will exhausted by students receiving a grade
1.
(ii) Since the top ranking institution is always able to take the very best students
(those with grade 1), if there are any grade 1 students who are not admitted to
College A then these will be most preferred by College B. Since grading systems are
designed to discriminate between ability, it’s assumed that the number of students
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receiving top grades does not exceed the capacity of the top (College A) and middle
(College B) ranking colleges. Then, college B must accept all grade 1 students
choosing the strategy BC and all grade 1 students with strategy AB who are not
accepted to A. The remainder of of B’s capacity is exhausted by grade 2 students
with strategies AB and BC.
(iii) Lastly, it is assumed that there is su cient provision for all Grade 1 and
2 students (with strategies AC and BC) who are not accepted to A or B to be
accepted to College C.
Under these assumptions, it is possible to find an expression for the expected utility of
each strategy. For example, as stated in assumption (i), college A’s capacity is exhausted
by grade 1 applicants so:
P (A | AB, 1) = qA
P (1)[m(AB) +m(AC)]
(5)
P (A | AC, 1) = P (A | AB, 1) (6)
The capacity remaining at A for grade 2 and 3 students is qA,2 = qA,3 = 0 (where qx,g is
the capacity at college x for students with grade g or below). Since by (ii), B’s capacity
is not exhausted by grade 1 students, the number of grade 1 students at B depends on
the number rejected from A:
P (B | BC, 1) = 1 (7)
P (B | AB, 1) = 1  P (A | AB, 1) (8)
The capacity remaining at B for students receiving other grades is:
qB,2 = qB   P (1)[m(AB)(1  P (A | AB, 1)) +m(BC)] (9)
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By (iii), College C’s capacity exceeds the student population and since by (ii), all grade
1 students with the strategy BC will be guaranteed a place at B, the only grade 1
students assigned to C are those with the strategy AC who are not assigned to A.
P (C | AC, 1) = 1  P (A | AB, 1) (10)
P (C | BC, 1) = 0 (11)
Similar expressions for the probabilities of Grade 2 and 3 students can be found in
Appendix F.1 and they can then be used to express the expected utility of each strategy
as in Equation 2. These expected utilities (u(A,B), u(A,C), u(B,C)) can be found
in Appendix F.2 and the mass of students choosing each strategy as a function of the
utility of each college and the capacity of each college is in Appendix F.3.
Normalising U(C) to 1, yields the following student masses applying using each strategy
in equilibrium:
m(AC) = [U(A)  1  U(A)U(B)qA + U(B)2qA   U(B)qA + qA   U(A)U(B)qB
+ U(B)2qB   U(B)qB + qB]/[U(A)  U(B)] (12)
m(AB) =
U(B)[qA  m(AC)(qa + qB)] +m(AC)(1 m(AC))  qA(1 m(AC))
(qA + qB)U(B)  1 m(AC) (13)
m(BC) = 1 m(AC) m(AB) (14)
In order to compare the e↵ects of changing utilities and and capacities in the following
sections, I use this solution in the following example:
Example 1: Suppose college capacity is such that qx =
1
4 for all x 2 X, P (g) = 13 for all
g 2 G and U(A) = 3, U(B) = 2, U(C) = 1 and U(?) = 0. Then, by equations 12, 13 and
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14, m(AB) = 14 , m(AC) =
1
2 andm(BC) =
1
4 and u(AB) = u(AC) = u(BC) =
2
3 .
The ex-ante proportion of students receiving each grade expected to be assigned to each
institution is shown in Figure 22. The left most bar represents the 13 mass of students
who are all expected to achieve a Grade 1. It shows that of those Grade 1 students, a
mass of 0.25 students will go to College A while the remaining mass of 112 students are
assigned to College B.
Grade
M
as
s
Figure 22: Ex-ante student assignment in Example 1. Proportion of
students assigned to each college A, B, C or ? by grade.
Example 1 and Figure 22 demonstrate an important result: despite the perceived prob-
lems associated with short lists and unknown grades, from an ex-ante perspective, the
mechanism M may perform just as well as student-proposing deferred acceptance. The
distribution of students illustrated in Figure 22 is also the expected (ex-ante) outcome
of deferred acceptance.
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Theorem 7. Ex-ante, the mechanism M can result in the same matching as the student-
proposing deferred acceptance mechanism.
To see that the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) would yield
the same result, recall that under DA, any student i can express their complete, strict
preference relation  i: A  i B  i C. Therefore, even though students do not know
their grades prior to application, their application can be considered by all colleges if
necessary. This means, in Step 1 of DA, college A accepts only grade 1 students, up
to qA = 0.25. The remainder of grade 1 students go to B in Step 2 of DA with the
remainder of B’s capacity being filled by grade 2 students. In Step 3, College C is filled
with the remaining grade 2 students and some grade 3 students, rejecting those in excess
of capacity qc.
3.3.2 Assortative Matching and U(A)
Of course, Theorem 7 relies heavily on the parametric assumptions in Example 1 and
simply becauseM works well in some circumstances does not suggest it will work equally
well in others. For example, consider the case where one college is considered dispropor-
tionately better than others. Such cases are not uncommon, Belfield et al. (2018) find
that men from the most selective Russell Group universities earn up to 50% more than
those from other institutions within the same group. Such conditions can a↵ect sorting
within the match.
Example 2: Let all parameters be the same as in Example 1, with the exception that
U(A) = 3.5. This increases the number of students who apply to A through either the
AB or AC strategy. Figure 23 shows that as U(A) increases to 3.5, m(AB) approaches
2
3 and m(AC) approaches
1
3 while m(BC) decreases to zero.
Example 2 yields the allocations represented in Figure 24(a), with the outcome from
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m(AB) m(AC) m(BC)
Figure 23: Change in strategy as U(A) increases from 3.0 to 3.5
Example 1 shown in panel (b) for comparison. If the ‘optimal’ match is considered to
be that achieved under DA, then the parameters in Example 2 take us to a less socially
desirable outcome. College A is still filled to capacity with grade 1 students, however
the talent of some grade 1 students is now wasted as they are assigned to college C.
Some grade 2 students are also left unassigned. The winner in this situation, however, is
College C who accept some grade 1 students it would not otherwise have recruited.
3.3.3 Assortative Matching and qx
Increased college capacity is another feature of the UK higher education market. In
2015/16 government caps on student numbers were removed (Hillman (2014)) allowing
all universities to expand their capacity. Large changes in capacity at all institutions can
also have dramatic e↵ects on assortativity in matching, as shown by Example 3.
Example 3: Let all parameters be the same as in Example 1, with the exception that
qx =
1
3 for all x 2 X. As the capacity of each institution increases to 13 , m(AB) increases
to 0.99 and m(AC) decreases to 0.01, while m(BC) decreases to zero.
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(a) (b)
Figure 24: Increasing U(A) (a) Ex-ante matching when U(A) = 3.5.
(b) Ex-ante matching when U(A) = 3.0.
Figure 25 shows how the increased capacity a↵ects assortativity in matching. As in
all previous example, College A still fills with grade 1 students, but with A’s increased
capacity, B is almost exclusively filled with grade 2 students; B can no longer take the
best students who are rejected by A. College C also su↵ers as the number of student
using a strategy featuring C approaches to zero. Grade 3 students also su↵er the most
in this example as they become increasingly unassigned.
3.4 Conclusion
The results in Section 3.3 are clearly very sensitive to the parametric assumptions, but
the examples illustrate how di↵erent groups of both colleges and students can be severely
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(a) (b)
Figure 25: Increasing qx to approaching
1
3 (a) Ex-ante matching under
M (b) Matching under DA.
disadvantaged by introducing the twin features of short listing and unknown grades into
an otherwise appealing mechanism. In the UK’s UCAS system, students are required
to cope with both of these hurdles as they must both narrow their options to a first
‘firm’ choice and a second ‘insurance’ choice. If the pre-results application is to persist
then this suggests further study should be conducted into increasing the number of
options any given student may choose. The argument for providing a less strategic entry
process is even more pertinent when considering widening participation. The inability to
master the UCAS admissions process is one feature likely to block entry to high status
universities for those from disadvantaged background (Jerrim (2013)). From a theoretic
stance, one important feature absent from the model discussed above is heterogenous
groups of students. Students may di↵er in their levels of risk aversion or in the accuracy
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of their information about programme entry. Many other policies to help those from
low-participation schools exist; costly tutoring and enrichment programmes for such
students may be partial solutions but reform in the admissions system may be more
e cient and can be made easily accessible to all. Further work is needed to establish
the extent to which reform in the admissions system might do more to allow fair access
to all institutions.
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Appendix
A Well ranked objects: Stability and Equilibrium
In Section 1.6, the proof of Theorem 1 was given only for the case where objects are
strictly well ranked. Lemmas 11 to 13 provide the proof of Theorem 1 for any set of
well ranked objects. In contrast to the strictly well ranked case (as in Lemma 6), when
objects are well ranked the set of stable learning profiles is only a subset of ex-ante
welfare maximising equilibria. For this reason, the proof of Theorem 1 utilises a wider
set of learning profiles, A⇤ in order to identify the ex-ante welfare maximising equilibria
in AE . A learning profile a is an element of A⇤ if and only if it meets the following three
conditions:
I: If n is even then all agents are in 2-cycles. If n is odd then all agents are in
2-cycles except for some i⇤ such that ⇡i⇤Ei⇤ = ⇡nEn.
and for any pair of agents i, j such that ⇡i > ⇡j and (i, j) 2 o(a):
II⇤: If there are two agents i0, j0 such that (i0, j0) 2 o(a) and ⇡i = ⇡i0 then ⇡j0   ⇡i.
III⇤: There is no agent j⇤ such that either ⇡i = ⇡j⇤ > ⇡j and Ei > Ej⇤   Ej or
⇡i > ⇡j⇤   ⇡j and Ei   Ej⇤ > Ej .
The set A⇤ has some similarities with the set AS in Section 1.4. The di↵erence is that
conditions II⇤ and III⇤ refer separately to the probability an object is acceptable, ⇡i,
and its conditional expected value, Ei. However, as shown in Lemma 15 when objects
are strictly well ranked, the sets AS and A⇤ are identical.
Lemma 11. When objects are well ranked, if a is an equilibrium and not an element of
A⇤ then a is also not in the set of ex-ante welfare maximising equilibria, AE.
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Proof. Fix some equilibrium learning profile aE 2 Ae such that aE /2 A⇤. Since aE /2 A⇤
it must violate one or more of I, II⇤ and III⇤. I consider each of these conditions in turn
and show that in every case a learning profile violating a condition cannot be an ex-ante
welfare maximising equilibrium since it is possible to construct an alternative learning
profile which is also an equilibrium and yields higher ex-ante welfare.
If aE violates I then either aE /2 argmaxa2A |C2(a)| or aE 2 argmaxa2A |C2(a)| and there
is some {i⇤} = B2(aE) such that ⇡i⇤Ei⇤ 6= mini2N ⇡iEi. First consider the case where
aE /2 argmaxa2A |C2(a)|, then there are two agents b, b0 2 B2(aE) as in Figure 26(a).
By Lemma 4 none of the agents in B2(aE) are in learning cycles and so Ub(aE) = 0
and Ub0(aE) = 0. Under a0 let a0b = b
0 and a0b0 = b. Since a
E 2 Ae, ai /2 {b, b0} for
all i 2 N and so (a0{b,b0}, a {b,b0}), as in Figure 26(b), is also an equilibrium. Since
(b, b0) 2 o(a0{b,b0}, a {b,b0}), Ub(a0{b,b0}, a {b,b0}) > 0 and Ub0(a0{b,b0}, a {b,b0}) > 0. Since
o(a0{b,b0}, a {b,b0}) = o(a
E) [ {(b, b0)}, W (aE) < W (a0{b,b0}, a {b,b0}). Then W (aE) < WE
and aE /2 AE .
b1 2 b’
C(a*) B(a*)
b1 2 b’
C(a*) B(a*)
(a)
(b)
Figure 26: Two learning profiles: (a) aE , (b) (a0{b,b0}, a {b,b0}). Ex-ante
welfare can be increased by pairing agents not in learning cycles in
2-cycles
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Next consider the case that aE 2 argmaxa2A |C2(a)| and there is some {i⇤} = B2(aE)
such that ⇡i⇤Ei⇤ 6= mini2N ⇡iEi, then there is some (j, n) 2 o(aE) such that ⇡nEn =
mini2N ⇡iEi. An example is shown in Figure 27(a). Under aE , Ui⇤(aE) = 0, Uj(aE) =
⇡j⇡nEn and Un(aE) = ⇡n⇡jEj . Let a0j = i⇤ and a0i⇤ = j. Since |o(aE)| = |o(a0{i⇤,j}, a {i⇤,j})|
and {n} = B(a0{i⇤,j}, a {i⇤,j}), by Lemma 4, (a0{i⇤,j}, a {i⇤,j}) is an equilibrium, as shown
in Figure 27(b). Under the learning profile (a0{i⇤,j}, a {i⇤,j}), Ui⇤(a
0
{i⇤,j}, a {i⇤,j}) =
⇡i⇤⇡jEj , Uj(a0{i⇤,j}, a {i⇤,j}) = ⇡j⇡i⇤Ei⇤ and Un(a
0
{i⇤,j}, a {i⇤,j}) = 0. Since ⇡i⇤Ei⇤ 6=
mini2N ⇡iEi, ⇡j⇡nEn < ⇡j⇡i⇤Ei⇤ . Since objects are well ranked, ⇡n  ⇡i for all i 2 N
so ⇡n⇡jEj  ⇡i⇤⇡jEj . Then,
P
i2{i⇤,j,n} Ui(a
E) <
P
i2{i⇤,j,n} Ui(a
0
{i⇤,j}, a {i⇤,j}). Since
every i 2 N \ {i⇤, j, n} is in the same learning cycle under aE and (a0{i⇤,j}, a {i⇤,j}),
W (aE) < W (a0{i⇤,j}, a {i⇤,j}) and so a
E /2 AE .
i* j
(b)
n
i* j
(a)
n
Figure 27: Two learning profiles: (a) aE , (b) (a0{i⇤,j,n}, a {i⇤,j,n}). If n
is odd then then agent n is not in a 2-cycle.
If aE violates II⇤ then there are two cycles (i, j), (i0, j0) 2 o(aE) such that ⇡i = ⇡i0 > ⇡j
and ⇡i > ⇡j0 as shown in Figure 28(a). Let a0i = i0, a0i0 = i, a
0
j = j
0, a0j0 = j and
S = {i, i0, j, j0}. If aE 2 AE then aE must meet I and since C2(aE) = C2(a0S , aE S), by
Theorem 4, (a0S , a
E
 S) is also an equilibrium as shown in Figure 28(b). If a 2 AE then
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W (aE)  W (a0S , aE S). Since all i 2 S are in 2-cycles with only other agents in S under
both learning profiles, W (aE) and W (a0S , a
E
 S) di↵er only in the sum of the expected
utilities of the four agents in S. To see
P
i2S Ui(a
0
S , a
E
 S) >
P
i2S Ui(a
E) first recall
⇡i0 > ⇡j and ⇡i > ⇡j0 . Then the following must hold:
⇡j(⇡iEi   ⇡j0Ej0) + ⇡j0(⇡i0Ei0   ⇡jEj) < ⇡i0(⇡iEi   ⇡j0Ej0) + ⇡i(⇡i0Ei0   ⇡jEj)
) ⇡i⇡j(Ei + Ej) + ⇡i0⇡j0(Ei0 + Ej0) < ⇡i⇡i0(Ei + Ei0) + ⇡j⇡j0(Ej + Ej0)
)
X
i2S
Ui(a
E) <
X
i2S
Ui(a
0
S , a
E
 S)
Since W (a0S , a
E
 S) > W (a
E), aE cannot be an ex-ante welfare maximising equilibrium if
aE violates II⇤.
(b) 
i i’ j j’
(a) 
i i’ j j’
Figure 28: Two learning profiles: (a) aE , (b) (a0S , a S). Two agents
with equally acceptable objects cannot both be in 2-cycles with agents
endowed with objects less likely to be acceptable.
If aE violates III⇤ then for some (i, j) 2 o(aE) there is a j⇤ such that either ⇡i = ⇡j⇤ > ⇡j
and Ei > Ej⇤   Ej or ⇡i > ⇡j⇤   ⇡j and Ei   Ej⇤ > Ej . If aE 2 AE then I must hold
for aE . Since ⇡j⇤Ej⇤ > ⇡jEj , there is some (j⇤, k) 2 o(a). An example of such learning
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cycles is shown in Figure 29(a). If k > j⇤ then ⇡k  ⇡j⇤ and so let a0i = j⇤, a0j⇤ = i,
a0k = j and a
0
j = k as shown in Figure 29(b). Let S = {i, j, j⇤, k}. Since I holds for aE
and C(aE) = C(a0S , a
E
 S), by Lemma 4, (a
0
S , a
E
 S) is also an equilibrium and an example
is shown in Figure 29(b). If a 2 AE⇤ then W (aE)   W (a0S , aE S). Since every i 2 N \ S
is in the same learning cycle under aE and (a0S , a
E
 S), W (a
E) and W (a0S , a
E
 S) can di↵er
only in the utilities of the four agents in S. Since either ⇡i = ⇡j⇤   ⇡k and ⇡j⇤ > ⇡j or
⇡i > ⇡j⇤   ⇡k and ⇡j⇤   ⇡k the following must hold:
⇡j(⇡iEi   ⇡kEk) + ⇡k(⇡j⇤Ej⇤   ⇡jEj) < ⇡j⇤(⇡iEi   ⇡kEk) + ⇡i(⇡j⇤Ej⇤   ⇡jEj)
) ⇡i⇡j(Ei + Ej) + ⇡j⇤⇡k(Ej⇤ + Ek) < ⇡i⇡j⇤(Ei + Ej⇤) + ⇡j⇡k(Ej + Ek)X
i2S
Ui(a
E) <
X
i2S
Ui(a
0
S , a
E
 S)
Then W (aE) < W (a0S , a
E
 S) and so a /2 AE . If k < j⇤ then ⇡k   ⇡j⇤ , a0i = k, a0k = i,
a0j⇤ = j and a0j = j⇤, an example of which is shown in Figure 30(b). The above argument
for k > j⇤ can then be applied to the case where k < j⇤ mutatis mutandis.
Lemma 12. When objects are well ranked, all learning profiles in A⇤ yield the same
ex-ante welfare and so A⇤ is the set of ex-ante welfare maximising equilibria AE.
Proof. Let   = { 1, ...  r¯} be a partition on N such that for any i 2  t and i0 2  t0 ,
⇡i > ⇡i0 if and only if t < t0. Ex-ante welfare of any learning profile a can then be
expressed as:
W (a) =
nX
i=1
Ui(a) =
r¯X
i=1
X
i2 r
Ui(a)
To define
P
i2 r Ui(a) for any given  
r, consider each of the following cases. In all
cases i0 2 argmaxi2 r ⇡iEi and i00 2 argmini2 r ⇡iEi . If  r 1 exists then i  2
argmini2 r 1 ⇡iEi and if  r+1 exists then i+ 2 argmaxi2 r+1 ⇡iEi. Examples of such
agents are shown in Figure 31.
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(b) 
i j* j k
(a) 
i j* j k
Figure 29: Two learning profiles for the case where k > j⇤: (a) aE ,
(b) (a0S , a S). A learning profile a cannot violate III
⇤ if a is a welfare
maximising equilibrium.
Case 1: Either r = 1 or | [r 1i=1  r| even.
Case 1a: | r| even. If | r| even then I, II⇤ and III⇤ imply that no i 2  r is in a
learning cycle with any i 2 N \  r. By I all agents in  r must be in 2-cycles with
other agents in  r as shown in Figure 31(a) Then
P
i2 r Ui(a) =
P
i2 r Ui(a) =
⇡2iEi.
Case 1b: | r| odd. If | r| odd then I, II⇤ and III⇤ imply no i 2  r is in a learning
cycle with any i 2  r0 where r0 < r. By I all agents in  r \{i00} must be in 2-cycles
with other agents in  r \ {i00}. Again by I, if r = r¯ then i00 is not in a learning
cycle (as shown in Figure 31(b)). Then
P
i2 r Ui(a) =
P
i2 r\{i00} ⇡
2
iEi. If r < r¯
then I, II⇤ and III⇤ imply (i00, i+) 2 o(a) and so Pi2 r Ui(a) =Pi2 r\{i00} ⇡2iEi +
⇡i00⇡i+Ei+ (as shown in Figure 31(c)).
Case 2: | [r 1i=1  r| odd.
Case 2a: | r| even. If | r| even then I, II⇤ and III⇤ imply that (i , i0) 2 o(a) and
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(b) 
i k j* j
(a) 
i k j* j
Figure 30: Two learning profiles for the case where j⇤ > k: (a) aE ,
(b) (a0S , a S). A learning profile a cannot violate III
⇤ if a is a welfare
maximising equilibrium.
all i 2  r \ {i0, i00} are in 2-cycles with other agents in  r \ {i0, i00}. If r = r¯ then
by I, i00 is not in a learning cycle (as shown in Figure 32(a)) and so
P
i2 r Ui(a) =P
i2 r\{i0,i00} ⇡
2
iEi + ⇡i0⇡i Ei  . If r < r¯ then I, II
⇤ and III⇤ imply (i00, i+) 2 o(a)
(as shown in Figure 32(b)) and so
P
i2 r Ui(a) =
P
i2 r\{i0,i00} ⇡
2
iEi + ⇡i0⇡i Ei  +
⇡i00⇡i+Ei+ .
Case 2b: | r| odd. If | r| odd then I, II⇤ and III⇤ imply that (i , i0) 2 o(a) and
since | r \{i0}| is even, all i 2  r \{i0} are in 2-cycles with other agents in  r \{i0}
(as shown in Figure 32(c)). Then
P
i2 r Ui(a) =
P
i2 r\{i0} ⇡
2
iEi + ⇡i0⇡i Ei  .
Then when a 2 A⇤, Pi2 r Ui(a), and in turn Pni=1 Ui(a), depends only on the the
number of agents in each  r. Since the number of agents does not change with the
learning profile, all a 2 A⇤ must yield the same ex-ante welfare. By Lemma 4, Ae 6= ;
and so AE must be nonempty. By Lemma 11 there is no a 2 AE that is not also an
element of A⇤. Since all a 2 A⇤ yield the same ex-ante welfare and by Lemma 4 all
a 2 A⇤ are equilibria, A⇤ = AE .
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(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
i’ i’’i— i+
  r - 1   r   r+1
i’ i’’i—
  r - 1   r
i’ i’’i— i+
  r - 1   r   r+1
Figure 31: Learning cycles for agents in  r when |Sr 1i=1  r| is even.
Lemma 13. If objects are well ranked then any stable learning profile is an ex-ante
welfare maximising equilibrium.
Proof. Let a 2 AS and a /2 A⇤. Then a violates at least one of conditions II⇤ and III⇤. If
a violates II⇤ then there are two pairs of agents i, j and i0, j0 such that (i, j), (i0, j0) 2 o(a),
⇡i > ⇡j and ⇡i = ⇡i0 > ⇡j0 . Since objects are well ranked and ⇡i > ⇡j0 , Ei   Ej0 and so
⇡iEi > ⇡j0Ej0 . Now consider the relationship between Ei and Ei0 .
Case 1: Ei = Ei0. If Ei = Ei0 then ⇡iEi = ⇡i0Ei0 and by condition III, ⇡iEi  ⇡j0Ej0 ,
which is a contradiction.
Case 2: Ei > Ei0. If Ei > Ei0 then since ⇡i = ⇡i0 , ⇡iEi > ⇡i0Ei0 . Since ⇡i = ⇡i0
and ⇡i > ⇡j , ⇡i0 > ⇡j which, since objects are well ranked, implies Ei0   Ej and so
⇡i0Ei0 > ⇡jEj . Then ⇡iEi > ⇡i0Ei0 > ⇡jEj and since (i, j) 2 o(a), this violates condition
III implying a /2 A⇤.
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  r - 1
  r - 1
i’ i’’i—
  r - 1   r
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
i’ i’’i— i+
  r   r+1
i’ i’’i— i+
  r   r+1
Figure 32: Learning cycles for agents in  r when |Sr 1i=1  r| is odd.
Case 3: Ei < Ei0. If Ei0 > Ei then since ⇡i = ⇡i0 , ⇡i0Ei0 > ⇡iEi. Since objects are well
ranked and ⇡i > ⇡j0 , Ei   Ej0 which implies ⇡iEi > ⇡j0Ej0 . Then ⇡i0Ei0 > ⇡iEi > ⇡j0Ej0
and since (i0, j0) 2 o(a), this violates condition III implying a /2 AS .
If a violates III⇤ then there exists a three agents i, j, j⇤ 2 N such that (i, j) 2 o(a) and
either ⇡i = ⇡j⇤ > ⇡j and Ei > Ej⇤   Ej or ⇡i > ⇡j⇤   ⇡j and Ei   Ej⇤ > Ej . In either
case, ⇡iEi > ⇡j⇤Ej⇤ > ⇡jEj and since (i, j) 2 o(a), this violates condition III implying
a /2 AS .
So it must be that if a 2 AS then a 2 A⇤ and since by Lemma 12 A⇤ = AE , a is an
ex-ante welfare maximising equilibrium.
Lemma 14. When objects are well ranked, the maximum ex-ante welfare that can be
achieved in equilibrium is:
WE =
X
i2N,i even
⇡i 1⇡i(Ei 1 + Ei)
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Proof. By Observation 1 A  ✓ AS and by Lemmas 2 and 13, AS ✓ AE . Following 2,
the set of learning cycles formed under any a  2 A  is o  and so the maximum ex-ante
welfare that can be achieved in equilibrium is:
WE =W (a ) =
X
i2N,i even
⇡i 1⇡i(Ei 1 + Ei)
for all a  2 A  ✓ AE .
Lemma 6 demonstrated that when objects are strictly well ranked and n = 4, a learning
profile is an ex-ante welfare maximising equilibrium if and only if it is stable. This is
not a coincidence and holds for any set of strictly well ranked objects.
Lemma 15. If objects are strictly well ranked then a learning profile is an ex-ante welfare
maximising equilibrium if and only if it is stable.
Proof. When objects are well ranked, AS is characterised by conditions I and III and
A⇤⇤ is characterised by conditions I and III⇤. Condition III⇤ states that for any pair
of agents i, j such that ⇡i > ⇡j and (i, j) 2 o(a) there exists no j⇤ such that either (i)
⇡i = ⇡j⇤ > ⇡j and Ei > Ej   Ej or (ii) ⇡i > ⇡j⇤   ⇡j and Ei   Ej > Ej . Since objects
are strictly well ranked, only (ii) is applicable and implies ⇡iEi > ⇡j⇤Ej⇤ > ⇡jEj . Then
III⇤ implies III and so A⇤ ✓ AS . By Lemma 12, A⇤ = AE and so AE ✓ AS . Then by
Lemma 13, AS ✓ AE and so AS = AE⇤.
B Closely well ranked objects and ex-ante welfare
When objects are closely well ranked then, as stated in Theorem 3, stable learning pro-
files yield either the maximum or close to the maximum ex-ante welfare over all learning
profiles. In addition to Lemma 9, the proof is given here via Lemmas 16 to 24. Condi-
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tions Ic, IIc, IIIc are closely related to I, II and III but allow for 3-cycles in addition
to 2-cycles.
Lemma 16. Condition Ic: If a 2 argmaxa2AW (a) then either all agents are in
learning cycles or all agents are in learning cycles with the exception of some i⇤ such
that ⇡i⇤ = mini2N ⇡i and Ei⇤ = mini2N Ei
Proof. Let a 2 argmaxa2AW (a) and B(a) > 1. Since no agent in B(a) is in a learn-
ing cycle, Ui(a) = 0 for all i 2 B(a). Let (a0B(a), a B(a)) be such that o(a0B(a), a B(a))
contains a |B(a)|-cycle between all agents in B(a). Then Ui(a0B(a), a B(a)) > 0 for all
i 2 B(a). Since no agent in B(a) is in a learning cycle under a, all agents in C(a)
are in the same learning cycle under both a and (a0B(a), a B(a)) and so
P
i2C(a) Ui(a) =P
i2C(a) Ui(a
0
B(a), a B(a)). Then
P
i2N Ui(a) <
P
i2N Ui(a
0
B(a), a B(a)) and a /2 argmaxa2AW (a).
So it must be that |B(a)|  1.
Now suppose B(a) = {i⇤} and ⇡i⇤ 6= mini2N ⇡i. Since objects are well ranked and
⇡i⇤ > ⇡n it must be that Ei⇤   En. Since B(a) = {i⇤}, n 2 C(a) and n is in some
m-cycle consisting of all agents in T ⇢ N , where n 2 T . Under this |T |-cycle:
X
i2T[i⇤
Ui(a) = ⇡n
Y
i2T\{n}
⇡i
0@En + X
i2T\{n}
Ei
1A (15)
Let (a0T[{i⇤}, a T[{i⇤}) be such that n is not in a learning cycle and o(a
0
T[{i⇤}, a T[{i⇤})
contains a single |T |-cycle between all agents in (T \{n})[{i⇤}. Under this new learning
profile: X
i2T[i⇤
Ui(a
0
T[{i⇤}, a T[{i⇤}) = ⇡i⇤
Y
i2T\{i⇤}
⇡i
0@Ei⇤ + X
i2T\{i⇤}
Ei
1A (16)
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Since T \ {n} = T \ {i⇤}, ⇡i⇤ > ⇡n and Ei⇤   En:
X
i2T[i⇤
Ui(a) <
X
i2T[i⇤
Ui(a
0
T[{i⇤}, a T[{i⇤}) (17)
Since no agent in T [ {i⇤} is in a learning cycle with any agent in C(a) \ (T [ {i⇤}), all
agents in C(a)\(T[{i⇤}) are in the same learning cycles under both a and (a0T[{i⇤}, a T[{i⇤})
and so for these agents:
X
i2C(a)\(T[{i⇤})
Ui(a) =
X
i2C(a)\(T[{i⇤})
Ui(a
0
T[{i⇤}, a T[{i⇤}) (18)
But then a /2 argmaxa2AW (a) since
P
i2N Ui(a) >
P
i2N Ui(a
0
T[{i⇤}, a T[{i⇤}). So it
must be that ⇡i⇤ = mini2N ⇡i.
Now suppose Ei⇤ > En. Repeating the argument above, if ⇡i⇤ = mini2N ⇡i and Ei⇤ > En
then the inequality in (16) and the equality in (17) hold, which again implies that
a /2 argmaxa2AW (a). So it must be that Ei⇤ = mini2N Ei.
Lemma 17. If a 2 argmaxa2AW (a) such that o(a) contains a learning cycle between
all agents in S ⇢ N then for all i, j 2 S such that ⇡i > ⇡j:
Condition IIc: If there is another set of agents S0 in a cycle under a then for
any i0, j0 2 S such that ⇡i = ⇡i0 it must be that ⇡j0   ⇡i.
Condition IIIc: There is no agent j⇤ 2 N such that either (i) ⇡i = ⇡j⇤ > ⇡j
and Ei > Ej⇤   Ej or (ii) ⇡i > ⇡j⇤   ⇡j and Ei   Ej⇤ > Ej.
Proof. Let a 2 argmaxa2AW (a) such that under a a learning cycle forms between all
agents in S ⇢ N and for some i, j 2 S, ⇡i > ⇡j . By Lemma 9 the agents in S are in
either a 2-cycle or a 3-cycle.
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Suppose a violates IIc. Then there is also another set of agents S0 in a cycle under a
such that for some i0, j0 2 S, ⇡i = ⇡i0 and ⇡j < ⇡i. By Lemma 9 the agents in S0 are
also in either a 2-cycle or a 3-cycle. Let a0 be such that o(a0) contains a learning cycle
between all agents in (S[i0)\{j} and a learning cycle between all agents in (S0[j)\{i⇤}
(as shown in Figures 33, 34 and 35). Since no agent is in N \ (S [ S0) is in a learning
cycle with any agent in S [ S0, all agents in N \ (S [ S0) are in the same learning cycles
under a and (a0(S[S0), a {(S[S0)}). Then:
X
k2N\(S[S0)
Uk(a) =
X
k2N\(S[S0)
Uk(a
0
(S[S0), a {(S[S0)})
.
Case 1: S, S0 ⇢ C3(a)
If all agents in S and S0 are in a 3-cycles under a (as shown in Figure 33) then a /2
argmaxa2AW (a) as
P
k2(S[S0) Uk(a) <
P
k2(S[S0) Uk(a
0
(S[S0), a {(S[S0)}). To see this,
note that since ⇡i = ⇡i0 > ⇡j , Ei0   Ej and so the following inequality must hold:
Ei0(⇡i⇡k   ⇡j0⇡k0)   Ej(⇡i⇡k   ⇡j0⇡k0)
Adding ⇡i⇡k(Ei + Ek)  ⇡j0⇡k0(Ej0 + Ek0) to both sides of the inequality:
⇡i⇡k(Ei+Ei0+Ek) ⇡j0⇡k0(Ei0+Ej0+Ek0)   ⇡i⇡k(Ei+Ej+Ek) ⇡j0⇡k0(Ej+Ej0+Ek0)
Since ⇡i0 > ⇡j > 0:
⇡i⇡i0⇡k(Ei + Ei0 + Ek) + ⇡j⇡j0⇡k0(Ej + Ej0 + Ek0) > ⇡i⇡j⇡k(Ei + Ej + Ek) + ⇡i0⇡j0⇡k0(Ei0 + Ej0 + Ek0)X
k2(S[S0)
Uk(a
0
(S[S0), a {(S[S0)}) >
X
k2(S[S0)
Uk(a)
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i j k i’ j’ k’
i i’ k j j’ k’
(a)
(b)
Figure 33: Violating condition IIc - Case 1. (a) Two learning cy-
cles under a between S and S0. (b) Two learning cycles under
(a0(S[S0), a {(S[S0)}) between agents in (S [ i0) \ {j} and agents in
(S0 [ j) \ {i⇤}.
Case 2: S ⇢ C3(a) and S0 ⇢ C2(a)
If the agents in S are in a 3-cycle and those in S0 are in a 2-cycle under a (as shown in Fig-
ure 34) then a /2 argmaxa2AW (a) as
P
k2(S[S0) Uk(a) <
P
k2(S[S0) Uk(a
0
(S[S0), a {(S[S0)}).
To see this, note that since ⇡i = ⇡i0 > ⇡j , Ei0   Ej and so the following inequality must
hold:
Ei0(⇡i⇡k   ⇡j0)   Ej(⇡i⇡k   ⇡j0)
Adding ⇡i⇡k(Ei + Ek)  ⇡j0Ej0 to both sides of the inequality:
⇡i⇡k(Ei + Ei0 + Ek)  ⇡j0(Ei0 + Ej0)   ⇡i⇡k(Ei + Ej + Ek)  ⇡j0(Ej + Ej0)
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Since ⇡i0 > ⇡j > 0:
⇡i⇡i0⇡k(Ei + Ei0 + Ek) + ⇡j⇡j0(Ej + Ej0) > ⇡i⇡j⇡k(Ei + Ej + Ek) + ⇡i0⇡j0(Ei0 + Ej0)X
k2(S[S0)
Uk(a
0
(S[S0), a {(S[S0)}) >
X
k2(S[S0)
Uk(a)
i j k i’ j’
i i’ k j j’
(a)
(b)
Figure 34: Violating condition IIc - Case 2. (a) Two learning cy-
cles under a between S and S0. (b) Two learning cycles under
(a0(S[S0), a {(S[S0)}) between agents in (S [ i0) \ {j} and agents in
(S0 [ j) \ {i⇤}.
Case 3: S ⇢ C2(a) and S0 ⇢ C3(a)
If the agents in S are in a 2-cycle and those in S0 are in a 3-cycle under a (as shown in Fig-
ure 35) then a /2 argmaxa2AW (a) as
P
k2(S[S0) Uk(a) <
P
k2(S[S0) Uk(a
0
(S[S0), a {(S[S0)}).
To see this, note that since ⇡i = ⇡i0 > ⇡j , Ei0   Ej and so the following inequality must
hold:
Ei0(⇡i   ⇡j0⇡k0)   Ej(⇡i   ⇡j0⇡k0)
103
Adding ⇡iEi   ⇡j0⇡k0(Ej0 + Ek0) to both sides of the inequality:
⇡i(Ei + Ei0)  ⇡j0⇡k0(Ei0 + Ej0 + Ek0)   ⇡i(Ei + Ej)  ⇡j0⇡k0(Ej + Ej0 + Ek0)
Since ⇡i0 > ⇡j > 0:
⇡i⇡i0(Ei + Ei0) + ⇡j⇡j0⇡k0(Ej + Ej0 + Ek0) > ⇡i⇡j(Ei + Ej) + ⇡i0⇡j0⇡k0(Ei0 + Ej0 + Ek0)X
k2(S[S0)
Uk(a
0
(S[S0), a {(S[S0)}) >
X
k2(S[S0)
Uk(a)
i j i’ j’ k’
i i’ j j’ k’
(a)
(b)
Figure 35: Violating condition IIc - Case 3. (a) Two learning cy-
cles under a between S and S0. (b) Two learning cycles under
(a0(S[S0), a {(S[S0)}) between agents in (S [ i0) \ {j} and agents in
(S0 [ j) \ {i⇤}.
Case 4: S, S0 ⇢ C2(a)
If S, S0 2 C2(a) then the proof in Lemma 11 regarding condition II⇤ applies and againP
k2(S[S0) Uk(a
0
(S[S0), a {(S[S0)}) >
P
k2(S[S0) Uk(a).
Since
P
k2(S[S0) Uk(a
0
(S[S0), a {(S[S0)}) >
P
k2(S[S0) Uk(a) holds for all cases, W (a) <
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W (a0(S[S0), a {(S[S0)}) and so a /2 argmaxa2AW (a) if it violates IIc.
Now suppose a violates IIIc and there is some j⇤ 2 N such that either (i) ⇡i = ⇡j⇤ > ⇡j
and Ei > Ej⇤   Ej or (ii) ⇡i > ⇡j⇤   ⇡j and Ei   Ej⇤ > Ej . Since either ⇡j⇤ > ⇡j or
Ej⇤ > Ej , by Lemmas 9 and 16, j⇤ must be in either a 2-cycle or a 3-cycle under a. But
then the arguments for Cases 1 to 4 above can be applied mutatis mutandis for each of
conditions (i) and (ii), replacing j0 with j⇤ .
Lemma 18. For a set of agents S = {i1, i2, i3, i4, i5} with well ranked objects, where
⇡i1   ⇡i2   ⇡i3   ⇡i4   ⇡i5, if two learning profiles a and a0 are such that (i1, i2), (i3, i4, i5) 2
o(a) and (i1, i2, i3), (i4, i5) 2 o(a0) then
P
k2S Uk(a)  
P
k2S Uk(a
0).
Proof. W.l.o.g let S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Since ⇡3 2 (0, 1):
E1 + E2   E4   E5   ⇡3(E1 + E2   E4   E5)
E1 + E2   E4   E5   ⇡3(E1 + E2 + E3)  ⇡3(E3 + E4 + E5)
E1 + E2   ⇡3(E1 + E2 + E3)   E4 + E5   ⇡3(E3 + E4 + E5)
Since 1   ⇡1   ⇡2   ⇡4   ⇡5 > 0, ⇡4⇡5⇡1⇡2  1:
E1 + E2   ⇡3(E1 + E2 + E3)   E4 + E5   ⇡3(E3 + E4 + E5)⇡4⇡5
⇡1⇡2
⇡1⇡2(E1 + E2) + ⇡3⇡4⇡5(E3 + E4 + E5)   ⇡1⇡2⇡3(E1 + E2 + E3) + ⇡4⇡5(E4 + E5)X
k2S
Uk(a)  
X
k2S
Uk(a
0)
Lemma 19. For a set of agents S = {i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6} with closely well ranked objects,
where ⇡i1   ⇡i2   ⇡i3   ⇡i4   ⇡i5   ⇡i6, if two learning profiles a and a0 are such
that (i1, i2), (i3, i4), (i5, i6) 2 o(a) and (i1, i2, i3), (i4, i5, i6) 2 o(a0) then
P
k2S Uk(a) >
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P
k2S Uk(a
0).
Proof. W.l.o.g let S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and consider Pk2S Uk(a) and Pk2S Uk(a0):
X
k2S
Uk(a) = ⇡1⇡2(E1 + E2) + ⇡3⇡4(E3 + E4) + ⇡5⇡6(E5 + E6)
X
k2S
Uk(a
0) = ⇡1⇡2⇡3(E1 + E2 + E3) + ⇡4⇡5⇡6(E4 + E5 + E6)
Since ⇡i 2 (0, 1) for all i 2 S, (⇡1⇡2⇡3)E1 < (⇡1⇡2)E1, (⇡1⇡2⇡3)E2 < (⇡1⇡2)E2,
(⇡4⇡5⇡6)E5 < (⇡5⇡6)E5 and (⇡4⇡5⇡6)E6 < (⇡5⇡6)E6 . Since objects are also well ranked
⇡3 > ⇡5⇡6 and so (⇡4⇡5⇡6)E4 < (⇡3⇡4)E4. Finally, since objects are close in acceptabil-
ity, ⇡1  ⇡4⇡2 and so (⇡1⇡2⇡3)E3  (⇡3⇡4)E3. Then
P
k2S Uk(a) >
P
k2S Uk(a
0).
Lemma 20. For a set of agents S = {i1, i2, i3, i4} with closely well ranked objects, where
⇡i1   ⇡i2   ⇡i3   ⇡i4, if two learning profiles a and a0 are such that (i1, i2), (i3, i4) 2 o(a)
and (i1, i2, i3) 2 o(a0) then
P
k2S Uk(a) >
P
k2S Uk(a
0).
Proof. W.l.o.g let S = {1, 2, 3, 4} and consider Pk2S Uk(a) and Pk2S Uk(a0):
X
k2S
Uk(a) = ⇡1⇡2(E1 + E2) + ⇡3⇡4(E3 + E4)
X
k2S
Uk(a
0) = ⇡1⇡2⇡3(E1 + E2 + E3)
Since ⇡i 2 (0, 1) for all i 2 S, (⇡1⇡2⇡3)E1 < (⇡1⇡2)E1, (⇡1⇡2⇡3)E2 < (⇡1⇡2)E2 and
(⇡3⇡4)E4 > 0 . Since objects are close in acceptability, ⇡1  ⇡4⇡2 and so (⇡1⇡2⇡3)E3 
(⇡3⇡4)E3. Then
P
k2S Uk(a) >
P
k2S Uk(a
0).
Lemma 21. Condition Vc: If a 2 argmaxa2AW (a), and objects are closely well
ranked then there is at most one 3-cycle in o(a).
Proof. Let a 2 argmaxa2AW (a). By Lemma 9 o(a) contains only 2-cycles and 3-cycles.
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If n  5 then there is at most one 3-cycle in o(a). Now consider sets of agents and objects
where n > 5. Since a 2 argmaxa2AW (a) by Lemma 17 it must meet conditions IIc and
IIIc so let o(a) = {o1(a), ..., o⌫(a)} where if i 2  j(a) and i0 2  j0(a) and j < j0 then
⇡i   ⇡i0 and Ei   Ei0 . Suppose o(a) contains 2 or more 3-cycles. Let ok(a) and ok0(a) be
two of those 3-cycles such that if there is some oj(a) such that k < j < k0 then oj(a) is
a 2-cycle. To see that the presence of two 3-cycles in o(a) implies a /2 argmaxa2AW (a),
let a0 = a1 = a and use the following algorithm:
Step q: If k0 = k + q then since both ok+q 1(aq) and ok+q(aq 1) are 3-cycles, by
Lemma 19, aq /2 argmaxa2AW (a) so end. If k0 6= k + q then by the definition of
k and k0, ok+q(aq 1) is a 2-cycle and ok+q 1(aq) is a 3-cycle. Let  k+q 1(aq) =
{q1, q2, q3} and  k+q(aq 1) = {q4, q5} where Sq = {q1, q2, q3, q4, q5} and since aq
meets IIc and IIIc, for any qi, qi0 2 Sq if i < i0 then ⇡i   ⇡i0 and Ei   Ei0 . Let aq+1
be such that  k+q 1(aq+1) = {q1, q2},  k+q(aq+1) = {q3, q4, q5} and all i 2 N \ Sq
are in the same learning cycles under both aq and aq+1. Then by Lemma 18,
W (aq) W (aq+1). Note aq+1 still meets IIc and IIIc. Continue to step q + 1.
Since the number of learning cycles in o(a) is finite, the algorithm must terminate at some
step q, where aq /2 argmaxa2AW (a). Since by the construction of aq, W (a)  W (aq),
a /2 argmaxa2AW (a) and so a cannot contain more than one 3-cycle.
Lemma 22. If there exists some a 2 argmaxW (a) and |C3(a)| = 3 then W (a) =W (a⇤)
for any a⇤ 2 A satisfying conditions Ic to Vc where o(a⇤) contains a single 3-cycle, o⌫(a⇤)
such that ⇡i  ⇡j and Ei  Ej for all i 2  ⌫(a⇤), j 2 C(a⇤) \  ⌫(a⇤).
Proof. Let a, a⇤ 2 A be two learning profiles each containing exactly one 3-cycle and
satisfying conditions Ic, IIc, IIIc, IVc and Vc. Since they both satisfy Ic, IIc and
IIIc, let o(a) = {o1(a), ...o⌫(a)} and o(a⇤) = {o1(a⇤), ...o⌫(a⇤)} where if i 2  j(a0) and
i0 2  j0(a0) and j < j0 then ⇡i   ⇡i0 and Ei   Ei0 for all a0 2 {a, a⇤}. Since a and a⇤
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satisfy Ic, IVc and Vc, |o(a)| = |o(a⇤)| so ⌫ = ⌫ 0. In o(a⇤) let o⌫(a⇤) be the 3-cycle.
Since a⇤ meets Ic, IIc, IIIc, ⇡i  ⇡j and Ei  Ej for all i 2  ⌫(a⇤), j 2 C(a⇤)\ ⌫(a⇤). In
o(a) let ok(a) be the 3-cycle such that ⇡i   ⇡j and Ei   Ej for all i 2  ⌫(a), j 2  ⌫(a⇤)
and either ⇡i⇤ > ⇡j or Ei⇤ > Ej or both for some i⇤ 2  k(a) and for all j 2  ⌫(a⇤). Then
k 6= ⌫. Since o(a) contains only one 3-cycle, any ok0(a) where k 6= k0 is a 2-cycle. Now
let a = a1 and apply the following algorithm:
Step q: Since ok(aq) is a 3-cycle and ok+1(aq) is a 2-cycle, let  k(a0) = {q1, q2, q3},
 k+1(aq) = {q4, q5} and Sq = {q1, q2, q3, q4, q5}. Since aq meets IIc and IIIc, for
any qi, qi0 2 Sq if i < i0 then ⇡i   ⇡i0 and Ei   Ei0 . Let aq+1 be such that
 k(aq+1) = {q1, q2} and  k+1(aq+1) = {q3, q4, q5} and all i 2 N \ Sq are in the
same cycles under both aq and aq + 1. Note that IIc and IIIc continue to hold
for aq+1. Then by Lemma 18, W (a) W (aq+1). If k + 1 = ⌫ then end, otherwise
continue to step q + 1.
Since o(a) is finite, the algorithm terminates at some step t. At step t, o⌫(at) is a 3-cycle.
Since at still satisfies IIc and IIIc, ⇡i  ⇡j and Ei  Ej for all i 2  ⌫(at), t 2 N \C(at).
If B(a⇤) = {i} for some i 2 N then by Ic, IIc, IIIc, IVc and Vc, B(a) = B(at) = {i0} for
some i0 2 N and by Ic, ⇡i = ⇡i0 and Ei = Ei0 . Then
P
i2o⌫(at) Ui(a) =
P
i2o⌫(a⇤) Ui(a).
W.l.o.g let o⌫(at) = o⌫(a⇤). All i 2 C(at) \ ⌫(at) and j 2 C(a⇤) \ ⌫(a⇤) are in 2-cycles.
Since when all agents are in 2-cycles IIc implies II⇤ and IIIc implies III⇤, by Lemma
12,
P
i2C(at) Ui(a
t) =
P
i2C(a⇤) Ui(a
⇤). Then W (at) =W (a⇤) and by construction of at,
W (a) W (at) =W (a⇤).
Lemma 23. If n is even and objects are closely well ranked then W ⇤ =WS.
Proof. Let n be even and fix some a 2 A satisfying Ic, IIc, IIIc, IVc and Vc. Suppose
o(a) contains the 3-cycle o⌫(a) where ⇡i  ⇡j and Ei  Ej for all i 2  ⌫(a), j 2
C(a) \  ⌫(a). By Lemma 22, if some a0 2 argmaxa2AW (a) such that C3(a0) 6= ;
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does exist then W (a) = W (a0) and so a 2 argmaxa2AW (a). Since a satisfies IVc
and Vc all other cycles in o(a) must be 2-cycles. Since n is even this implies there is
some i⇤ 2 B(a). By Ic, ⇡i⇤  ⇡i and Ei⇤  Ei for all i 2 N . Since a satisfies IIc
and IIIc, all i 2  ⌫(a) [ {i⇤} must be closely well ranked. But then by Lemma 20,
a /2 argmaxa2AW (a). Then all cycle in o(a) are 2-cycles.
Since when all cycles are 2-cycles, IIc implies II⇤ and IIIc implies III⇤, a 2 A⇤ and so
by Lemma 12, W ⇤ =WS .
Lemma 24. If n is odd and objects are closely well ranked then either W ⇤ = WS or
W ⇤ and WS di↵er only in the sum expected utilities of three agents with the three worst
endowments so that WS  WE⇤ = ⇡n 2⇡n 1(⇡n(En 2 + En 1 + En) + En 2 + En 1).
Proof. Suppose there is no a 2 argmaxa2AW (a) such that C3(a) = ;. Since all a 2
argmaxa2AW (a) must satisfy Ic, IIc, IIIc, IVc and Vc, for each a 2 argmaxa2AW (a)
there exists some i⇤ 2 B(a) such that ⇡i⇤  ⇡i and Ei⇤  Ei for all i 2 N , while all
i 2 N \ {i⇤} are in 2-cycles. Since when all cycles are 2-cycles, IIc implies II⇤ and IIIc
implies III⇤, a 2 A⇤ and so by Lemma 12, W ⇤ =WS .
Suppose there is some a 2 argmaxa2AW (a) such that C3(a) 6= ;. Since a satisfies Ic,
IIc, IIIc, IVc and Vc, by Lemma 22:
W ⇤ =
X
i2N\{n 2,n 1,n},i even
⇡i 1⇡i(Ei 1 + Ei) + ⇡n 2⇡n 1⇡n(En 2 + En 1 + En)
By Lemma 14,WS =
P
i2N,i even ⇡i 1⇡i(Ei 1+Ei) and soW
S W ⇤ = ⇡n 2⇡n 1(⇡n(En 2+
En 1 + En) + En 2 + En 1).
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C Outcomes of an individually rational, Pareto optimal
mechanism
Lemma 25. If M is an individually rational and Pareto optimal mechanism then
M(R(a,!)) = GTT (R(a,!)).
Proof. Let M be an individually rational and Pareto optimal mechanism and suppose
M(R(a,!)) 6= GTT (R(a,!)). Since a di↵erent matching is produced under M and
GTT , there is some i⇤ 2 N for which M(R(a,!))(i⇤) 6= GTT (R(a,!))(i⇤). Since there
is one test per agent, either (i) there is a single j⇤ 2 N such that j⇤Pi⇤(a,!)i⇤ or (ii)
i⇤Pi⇤(a,!)i for all i 2 N \ {i⇤}. If (ii) holds then since GTT is individually rational,
GTT (R(a,!))(i⇤) = i⇤ and so M(R(a,!))(i⇤) 6= i⇤. But then M is not individually
rational and so it must be that Pi⇤ is as described in (i).
SinceM andGTT are individually rational,M(R(a,!))(i⇤), GTT (R(a,!))(i⇤) 2 {i⇤, j⇤}.
If GTT (R(a,!))(i⇤) = j⇤ then M(R(a,!))(i⇤) = i⇤. Since each agent has only one
test, there is a vector of agents (i1, ...it¯) such that i
⇤, j⇤ 2 {i1, ...it¯}, it+1Pit¯(a,!)j
for all j 2 N \ {it+1}, t 2 {1, ..., t¯   1} and i1Pit¯(a,!)j for all j 2 N \ {it¯}. Since
M(R(a,!))(i⇤) = i⇤ and M is individually rational, can only be matched with their
own endowment under M : M(R(a,!))(j) = j for all j 2 {i1, ..., it¯}. Then, under
M(R(a,!)) there is a Pareto improvement possible where each j 2 {i1, ..., it¯} is matched
with GTT (R(a,!))(j) and all i 2 N \ {i1, ..., it¯} are matched with M(R(a,!))(i). Since
M is Pareto optimal, it cannot be that GTT (R(a,!))(i⇤) = j⇤ and M(R(a,!))(i⇤) = i⇤.
If GTT (R(a,!))(i⇤) = i⇤ then M(R(a,!))(i⇤) = j⇤. Since M is individually rational,
there must be some vector of agents (i1, ...it¯) such that i
⇤, j⇤ 2 {i1, ...it¯},M(R(a,!))(it) =
it+1 for all t 2 {1, ..., t¯   1} and M(R(a,!))(it¯) = i1. Let P ⇤(a,!) be such that
ii+1P ⇤it(a,!)j for all j 2 N \ {it+1}, t 2 {1, ..., t¯   1} and i1P ⇤it¯(a,!)j for all j 2
N \ {it¯}. If P ⇤i (a,!) = Ri(a,!) for all i 2 {i1, ...it¯} then in Step 1 of GTT , all
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i 2 {i1, ...it¯} point at and are matched to their most preferred object under P ⇤(a,!)
and so GTT (R(a,!))(i⇤) = j⇤. Since GTT (R(a,!))(i⇤) = i⇤, it must be that P ⇤i (a,!) 6=
Ri(a,!) for all i 2 {i1, ...it¯}. Since each agent prefers at most one object to their own
endowment, there is some j0 2 {i1, ..., it¯} matched under M(R(a,!)) with an object
not strictly preferred to their own endowment. Since there is an exchagne between all
i 2 {i1, ..., it¯}, M(R(a,!))(j0) 6= j0 and so j0Pj0M(R(a,!))(j0) andM is not individually
rational.
D Mixed Strategies
Chapter 1 focusses on only pure strategies for all agents and compares the maximum ex-
ante welfare achievable under both equilibrium (WE) and stable learning profiles (WS).
Theorem 2 shows that when agents are restricted to using pure strategies and objects
are well ranked WE = WS . Allowing for mixed strategies changes this relationship
so that the stable learning profile may yield a lower ex-ante welfare than that of the
ex-ante welfare maximising equilibrium. This can be seen via the following three agent
example in which all agents and objects are ex-ante identical. It shows firstly that a
mixed strategy equilibrium exists in which no agent is using a pure strategy, secondly
that the ex-ante welfare is greater than can be achieved under pure strategies and lastly
that it exceeds the ex-ante welfare of any stable learning profile for this set of agents.
Example 1 (Part a: Equilibrium): Let N = {1, 2, 3}, ⇡1 = ⇡2 = ⇡3 and E1 = E2 =
E3 so that all agents and their endowments are ex-ante identical. Let a be such that
each agent learns about one of the two other agents’ endowments with a probability of
0.5. Since each agent must learn about one other object, whichever endowment each
agent actually investigates, at least one learning cycle must form. That learning cycle
will either be a 2-cycle or a 3-cycle. Let Pr(oj | a) be the probability the learning cycle
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oj occurs under the mixed strategy learning profile a. Under this learning profile, there
is some probability Agent 1 will be in either the 2-cycle (1,2) or (1,3). If this is the case
then because all agents endowments are ex-ante identical, the expected utility of such a
2-cycle for a Agent 1 is ⇡21E1. However there is also a probability that Agent 1 will be
in one of the possible 3-cycles, (1,2,3) or (1,3,2). Agent 1’s expected utility of either of
these cycles is ⇡31E1. Given the probability of any given learning cycle occurring, Agent
1’s expected utility can be expressed as:
U1(a) = Pr((1, 2) | a)⇡21E1+Pr((1, 3) | a)⇡21E1+Pr((1, 2, 3) | a)⇡31E1+Pr((1, 3, 2) | a)⇡31E1
If Agent 1 chooses to alter her strategy by increasing the probability she investigates
the endowment of Agent 2 then the probability of the the learning cycle (1,2) increases
and the probability of (1,3) occurring decreases. Similarly, the probability of (1,2,3)
occurring increases and decreases for (1,3,2). However, since the endowments of Agents
2 and 3 are ex-ante identical for Agent 1, this does not increase Agent 1’s expected
utility. This can be seen in the expression for Agent 1’s utility. Let a0 be such that
Agent 1 chooses to investigate Agent 2’s endowment with probability ↵ and Agent 3’s
endowment with probability (1   ↵) and Agents 2 and 3 choose to investigate each of
the other agent’s endowments with probability 0.5 (as under a):
U1(a
0) =
↵
2
⇡21E1 +
(1  ↵)
2
⇡21E1 +
↵
4
⇡31E1 +
(1  ↵)
4
⇡31E1
=
⇡21E1
2
+
⇡31E1
4
Since given the mixed strategies of Agents 2 and 3, Agent 1’s utility does not depend
on ↵, Agent 1 cannot achieve a higher expected utility than she does under a. Since
all agents and their endowments are ex-ante identical, the same argument can be made
mutatis mutandis for Agents 2 and 3 and so a is an equilibrium.
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Example 1 (Part b: Ex-ante Welfare): Under the learning profile a (described in
Part a of this example), each of the five possible learning cycles can arise with some
positive probability: the 2-cycles (1,2), (1,3) and (2,3) each occur with probability 0.25
and the 3-cycles (1,2,3) and (1,3,2) each occur with probability 0.125. Since all agents
and their endowments are ex-ante identical, conditional on a 2-cycle occurring, ex-ante
welfare is 2⇡21E1 whereas conditional on a 3-cycle occurring, ex-ante welfare is 3⇡
3
1E1.
Depending on the probability an object is acceptable ⇡1, the ex-ante welfare of a 3-cycle
can exceed that of a 2-cycle:
2⇡21E1 < 3⇡
3
1E1
2
3
< ⇡1
Since under pure strategies a 3-cycle cannot occur in equilibrium, ex-ante welfare under
pure strategies is 2⇡21E1. However, since under the mixed strategy learning profile a,
3-cycles occur with some positive probability,W (a) is greater than ex-ante welfare under
only pure strategies if ⇡1 >
2
3 .
Example 1 (Part c: Stability): It is the possibility of a 3-cycle occurring which
means that the learning profile a cannot be stable. This is because simply being in a
learning cycle is no guarantee to an agent in the cycle that they will be able to exchange
their endowment; each agent in the cycle needs their test to be successful such that
all agents in the cycle prefer their investigated object to their own endowments. The
larger the learning cycle, the lower the probability of an exchange taking place. Under
a, the probability a 3-cycle results in an exchange for any given agent is ⇡31, while the
probability a 2-cycle results in an exchange for either agent in the 2-cycle is ⇡21 > ⇡
3
1.
Since E1 = E2 = E3 this means that an agent has a higher expected utility if they are
in any 2-cycle rather than one of the 3-cycles. This means that a cannot be stable since
Agents 1 and 2 have a higher expected utility under any a00 where a001 = 2 and a002 = 3
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than under a. If, for this set of agents and endowments, under a stable learning profile
there can be no possibility of a 3-cycle occurring then the ex-ante welfare of any stable
learning profile is 2⇡21E1. Part b of the example demonstrated that when ⇡1 >
2
3 , this is
less than the ex-ante welfare of the mixed strategy equilibrium learning profile a.
E Size of Preference Cycles in Equilibrium
Proof of Lemma 10:
Proof. Suppose there is some preference cycle o1(h0) = (i1, ..., im) such that m   3 at
h0. Then there is a set of subhistories of h0, {h1, ...hm}, such that aik(sik , hk) = ik+1 for
k 2 {1, ...,m} and aim(sim , hm) = i1.
Case 1: Two or more agents learn in the same period and complete a preference cycle
in the revelation period immediately following.
First consider the case where two or more agents learn at the same history (a learning
period) and complete the preference cycle o(h0) in the next period. Then there is some
hk = hk
0
such that k 6= k0 and since o1(h0) forms in the next period, h0 = (hk, a(s, hk)).
Let Y k be the set of agents which comprise the cycle o1(h0) who all expend their test at
hk: Y k := {i | i 2  1(h0) and ai(si, hk) 6= x}. Then ik, ik0 2 Y k.
Since the preference cycle o1(h0) is complete at h0 and |Y k|   2, Ui(s |hk)  p2v¯ for all
i 2 Y k. If Y k =  1(h0) then |Y k|   3 and Ui(s|hk) < p2v¯ for all i 2 Y k but for s0ik such
that aik(s
0
ik
, hk) = i, Ui2(s|hk) = p2v¯ > Uik(s|hk).
If Y k 6=  1(h0) then, since the preference cycle o1(h0) exists at h0, there is some i⇤ 2 Y k
such that at h⇤, aj⇤(sj⇤ , h⇤) = i⇤ where j⇤ 2  1(h0) and h⇤ is a subhistory of hk. Since
|Y k|   2, Ui(s |hk)  p2v¯ for all i 2 Y k but for s0i⇤ such that ai⇤(s0i⇤ , hk) = j⇤, a learning
cycle forms between two agents and so Ui⇤((s0i⇤ , s i⇤)|hk) = pv¯ > Ui⇤(s|hk).
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Case 2: Two or more agents learn in the same period and extend a preference chain, but
do not complete a preference cycle, in the revelation period immediately following.
Now consider the case where two or more agents learn at the same history (in a learning
period) but do not complete the preference cycle o(h0) in the next preference revelation
period. That is, there is some hk = hk
0
such that k 6= k0 and h00 = (hk, a(s, hk)) 6= h0
but (hk, a(s, hk)) is a subhistory of h0. Let Y k := {i | i 2  1(h0) and ai(si, hk) 6= x}.
Suppose there is some subset of agents Y j ⇢ Y k such that |Y j |   2 and all members of
Y j form a single preference chain at h00. Since the preference cycle o1(h0) does not exist
at h00 and |Y j |   2, further tests by other agents in  1(h0) must be successful before
the preference cycle o1(h0) is complete and so Ui(s|hk) < p2v¯ for all i 2 Y j . But since
the members of Y j form a preference chain, there are two agents j⇤, j0 2 Y j such that
aj0(sj0 , hk) = j⇤ and so for s0j⇤ such that aj⇤(s0j⇤ , hk) = j0, Uj⇤((s0j⇤ , s j⇤)|hk) = p2v¯ >
Uj⇤(s|hk) and s is not an equilibrium.
Case 3: Two or more agents learn in the same period but neither extend a preference
chain or complete a preference cycle in the revelation period immediately following.
There is a gap at h if between any two agents ir and ir00 , who both expend their tests at
h, there is another agent ir0 who comes between ir and ir00 in the preference cycle o1(h0)
but ir0 only expends her test in a later period. That is, there is a gap at h if there are
two agents ir, ir00 2 o1(h0) such that air(sir , h), air00 (sir00 , h) 6= x but air0 (sir0 , h) = x and
Air0 (sir0 , h) = (N \ {ir0) [ {x} for all ir0 2 o1(h0) such that r < r0 < r00.14 Let G(h)
be the set of gaps that exist at h. Since the preference cycle o1(h0) occurs at h0 there
must be some subhistory (h, hg) of h0 at which G(h) 6= G(h, hg) so that the gaps which
existed at h no longer exist at (h, hg). Let H be the set of histories (h, hg) such that
l(h, hg) < l(h0) and G(h) 6= G(h, hg). If at one such h 2 H, two or more gaps cease to
exist for the first time at the same period then either Case 1 or Case 2 above applies
14where r, r0 and r00 are modulo m
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and s is not an equilibrium. If only one gap ceases to exist in each learning period in
every history h 2 H then consider the history at which the penultimate gap ceases to
exist as a result of air0 (sir0 , h) then Case 2 applies.
Case 4: Only one agent learns in each period
If at most one agent in  1(h0) learns in each period then there is no ik, ik0 2  1(h0)
such that hk = hk
0
. W.l.o.g let (h1, ..., hm, a(s, hm)) = h0. Consider agent im 1. When
agent im 1 investigates aim 1(sim 1 , hm 1) = m, agent im has not yet expended her
test and so Uim 1(s|hm 1)  p2v¯. However, for s0im 1(s0im 1 , hm 1) = m   2, since at
some subhistory of hm 1, im 1’s endowment has already been investigated by im 2,
Uim 1((s
0
im 1 , s im 1)|hm 1) = pv¯.
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F Expected utility calculation
In addition to the probabilities of grade 1 students attending each college x given each
strategy, the probabilities can also be determined for grade 2 and grade 3 students to
calculate expected utility.
F.1 Probabilities
For students with grade 2:
P (A | AB, 2) = 0 (19)
P (A | AC, 2) = 0 (20)
P (B | BC, 2) = qB2
P (2)[m(AB) +m(BC)]
(21)
P (B | AB, 2) = P (B | BC, 2) (22)
P (C | BC, 2) = 1  P (B | BC, 2) (23)
P (C | AC, 2) = 1 (24)
Capacities for grade 3 students:
qA3 = 0 (25)
qB3 = 0 (26)
(qC is irrelevant since it’s capacity is never exhuasted.)
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For students with grade 3:
P (A | AB, 3) = 0 (27)
P (A | AC, 3) = 0 (28)
P (B | AB, 3) = 0 (29)
P (B | BC, 3) = 0 (30)
P (C | BC, 3) = 1 (31)
P (C | AC, 3) = 1 (32)
F.2 Expected utilities
u(AB) = P (A | AB) · U(A) + P (B | AB) · U(B) (33)
= U(A)P (A | AB, 1)P (1) + U(B)[P (B | AB, 1)P (1) + P (B | AB, 2)P (2)] (34)
= U(A)
qA
m(AB) +m(AC)
+ U(B)[P (1)(1  qA
P (1)[m(AB) +m(AC)]
+
qB2
m(AB) +m(BC)
]
(35)
u(AC) = P (A | AC) · U(A) + P (C | AC) · U(C) (36)
= U(A)P (A | AC, 1)P (1) + U(C)[P (C | AC, 1)P (1) + P (C | AC, 2)P (2) + P (C | AC, 3)P (3)]
(37)
= U(A)
qA
m(AB) +m(AC)
+ U(C)(P (1)(1  qA
P (1)[m(AB) +m(AC)]
) + P (2) + P (3))
(38)
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u(AC) = P (B | BC) · U(B) + P (C | BC) · U(C) (39)
= U(B)[P (B | BC, 1)P (1) + P (B | BC, 2)P (2)] + U(C)[P (C | BC, 2)P (2) + P (C | BC, 3)P (3)]
(40)
= U(B)(P (1) +
qB2
m(AB) +m(BC)
) + U(C)(P (2)(1  qB2
P (2)(m(AB) +m(BC)
) + P (3))
(41)
F.3 Equilibrium Solution
Solving the equations for u(AB), u(AC) and u(BC) in Section F.2, in combination with
equations 3 and 4 yields:
m(AC) = [U(A)U(C) U(C)2 U(A)U(B)qA+U(B)2qA U(B)U(C)qA+U(C)2qA U(A)U(B)qB
+ U(B)2qB   U(B)U(C)qB + U(C)2qB]/[U(C)(U(A)  U(B))]
m(AB) =
U(B)[qA  m(AC)(qa + qB)] + U(C)[m(AC)(1 m(AC))  qA(1 m(AC))]
(qA + qB)U(B)  U(C)(1 m(AC))
m(BC) == 1 m(AC) m(AB)
Or, as shown in Section 3.3.1, if normalising U(C) to 1:
m(AC) = [U(A)  1  U(A)U(B)qA + U(B)2qA   U(B)qA + qA   U(A)U(B)qB
+ U(B)2qB   U(B)qB + qB]/[U(A)  U(B)]
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m(AB) =
U(B)[qA  m(AC)(qa + qB)] +m(AC)(1 m(AC))  qA(1 m(AC))
(qA + qB)U(B)  1 m(AC)
m(BC) == 1 m(AC) m(AB)
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